

APPENDIX NO. 5

NOTES ON THE CAPTURE AND INTERROGATION OF
3 PW CAPTURED 022000A AT 75505197 BY RHLI
AND INTERROGATED AT 2 CDN INF DIV PW CAGE
BY CAPT JW HENLEY

A SUCCESSFUL PATROL

- 1 At 2000 hrs 2 Dec a four-man patrol from D Coy of the RHLI captured all three members of a German standing patrol dug in alongside a haystack at MR 75505197.
- 2 By any standards our patrol did an excellent job. That the Germans concerned share our opinion of the patrol's efficiency is borne out by the following translation of one PW's written version of the affair:-

"Report on the Capture of our Patrol at 2000 hrs on 2 Dec
By Grenadier Franz BAUER.

On the evening of 2 Dec at 1800 hrs the three of us left our posn on patrol to observe the enemy. Our patrol consisted of a cpl and two ptes all armed with MPs. After we had reconnoitred the indicated terrain without observing anything we arrived at the designated haystack where we had been ordered to lay up until 0600 hrs on 3 Dec in order to determine at what time the enemy put out his outposts and in what str. We dug ourselves in and observed the ground in the direction of the enemy.

We had been waiting for about an hour when we were surprised and taken prisoner by a four-man patrol of the Canadian Legion. Everything happened so fast that in spite of our careful watching and our weapons it was impossible to defend ourselves.

It is still a mystery to me how the enemy approached. They stood before us as if they had come up out of the ground. I must admit they were very well cam, but nevertheless they must have been very skilled and well-disciplined people, otherwise it would have been impossible to surprise us.

I also said to my comrades we need not be ashamed of being taken prisoner for we could not keep up with men as skilled and disciplined as those of the Cdn patrol, in spite of the fact we have all been soldiering for five years."

3 WHAT THESE PW TOLD US

All PW talked readily, but two in particular, both over forty yrs of age and both political prisoners on remand with an opportunity to redeem themselves at the front after indiscreet expression of political views, were anxious to help us with infm.

Following are some of the items gleaned:-

Identification

PW are from 3 coy of 1 Bn 1224 Grenadier Regt of 190 Inf Div. PW claim that 76 Regt, formerly in the area was withdrawn about four weeks ago leaving behind its NCOs to take over in other bns still in the area. On the left of PW's bn presence of 1225 GR is reported and on the right a bn numbered 46.

Comment

It is evident that the reforming of 190 Div previously reported has continued and may now be on a firm basis with two instead of three Grenadier Regts in the div numbered 1224 and 1225 and re-

placing 30 and 520. The recent identification on our right flank of 1223 GR of 180 Inf Div, a div formed in the same 'wave' as 190 Div, tends to confirm the re-numbering in 190 Div. For lack of other info it is reasonable to assume that 46 Bn, to the right of PW's posn is, in fact, a bn of 1224 GR still known to PW by its old number while a part of 30 GR.

Dispositions

3 Coy in trenches from 757517 to 759522 thence SE along rd to 762521. 2 coy is said to be left and 1 coy left of 2 coy and the so-called 46 Bn to the right of the GRAFWEGEN rd.

1225 GR believed by PW left of 1 coy of their bn.

Str

3 coy estimated 75 strong, divided into 3 pls each of 3 secs.

Locations


- (a) Pl HQ 75965218.
- (b) Coy HQ 75995205.
- (c) Bn HQs 75465075
75585075.
- (d) Large house or chateau at 75985078 said to be occupied by offrs.
- (e) Div HQ in school 879449.
- (f) Amn dumps 878452.

Defs

- (a) Mortars at 76485182 and 76625175. The former location is protected by about 1000 yds of wire booby trapped with grenades.
- 7 (b) Tree-lined rd from 755519 NE to 757523 mined - density or type NOT known.
- (c) Track from 755519 SE to 757516 possibly mined or trapped with trip flares.
- (d) Following sketch is from PW description of 3 coy's dug-in posns:

Occupied by two men -
every 3rd or 4th
weapon slit has IMG

Small dugout for one
man sleeping



.../3

Personalities

Comd I Br 1224 GR - Capt WOHLGAST.

Morale

As usual described as low - food poor - 3 cigarettes per man per day. Personnel either overage and low category or very young and inexperienced.

JWH/JEM
HAND/DRLS

J. W. Hendley Capt.
1.0.
HQ 2 Cdn Inf Div

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GS 2 Cdn Inf Div
6 Dec 44

2 CDN INF DIV INT SUMMARY NO 21

Ref Maps: 1/100,000, GSGS 2541, Sheets 1 - 5
1/100,000, GSGS 4416, Sheets N1, P1, Q1
1/250,000, GSGS 4042, Sheet 2A & 3A
1/250,000, GSGS 4346, Sheets K51 - K53

PART I

On 2 Dec the Germans breached the dyke at E710763 on the North side of the island between the NEDER RIJN and the WAAL. This is the only pt on the island in enemy hands where the waters of the NEDER RIJN at normal level wash the main dyke. The latest photos are not yet available but the whole island North of the rly and West of RANDWIJK E6174 appears to be inundated and both sides have been forced to evac the tps from their more Northerly posns.

Early on 4 Dec the enemy launched a 2 coy attack from the East on to the area of HALDEREN E7666. The attack was a dismal failure resulting in 110 prisoners taken and approximately 50 dead counted on the ground while own tps' cas were lt. Interrogation of PW revealed a surprising lack of proper Int in planning the attack and an astonishing ineptitude in the execution and coordination of the op. 6 Para Div recently took over the sector from 10 SS and the junior leaders seem to have known very little about our dispositions. On the night of 1/2 Dec every pl was ordered to send out patrols and the attack itself was originally planned for 2 Dec. The object of the op seems to have been to straighten out the line by taking HALDEREN and BEMMEL. No demolitions were carried and the taking or destroying of the NIJMEGEN br does not seem to have had any part in this particular op. The actual connection between the flooding of the island and the attack this morning has not been determined. It may be that the Germans acquired some not very accurate flood infm from loyal Dutchmen. Tac R reports seem to indicate that the enemy is evac tps and eqpt across the NEDER RIJN at the Eastern end of the island.

There are four enemy divs at the present time facing the Corps front.. Opposite own front is 190 Inf Div with HQ reported recently by PW to be at ASPERDEN 879449 and responsible for the sector from just NORTH of HEIJEN 7843 to approx the 54 NORTHING, thus incl all of the REICHSWALD. The inf elements are 1224 GR on the enemy right and 1225 GR, reported by PW of 1224 GR captured at 75505197, as being on their left, although probably SOUTH of the 50 NORTHING following the capture yesterday at 745503 of a paybook from 7 coy II Bn of 1224 GR. It is not likely, however, that the two bns of 1224 GR are controlling a sector from the 503 to the 540 NORTHINGS and a further identification remains to be made between the 528 and 540 NORTHINGS. 84 Div is on the Right of 190 with its Right bdy on the WAAL. 1051 GR of this Div is in posn on our left front employing I and III bns fwd and II bn in res, according to last PW statements, but relieving the fwd bns at regular intervals. South of the WAAL in the REICHSWALD Forest area in addition to 84 and 190 Inf Divs there is probably a res div. North of the WAAL with its Right bdy probably incl ARNHEM is 6 Para Div. On its Right extending probably as far as TIEL is an unidentified Div which might turn out to be TETTAU.

.../2

On the front of our Left flanking Corps 711 and 712 Divs have closed in to cover the sector vacated by 59 Div which was reported on 30 Nov to be on the move North from ASPEREN E1968. 711 seems also to have expanded its front Westwards to incl the area vacated by 256 Div.

Although the enemy has undoubtedly thinned out his forces along the River West of TIEL there is not sufficient infm to confirm the report that he is evac his tps and eqpt from Western HOLLAND leaving behind only enough to cover a total withdrawal should we attempt a thrust Northward. The hy tp mov in the rear areas during the past few weeks has been the mov out of upwards of six divs and the arrival in North about LEIDEN and AMSTERDAM of possibly two divs from the area of the IJSSEL line. The three remaining divs on the River between TIEL and the sea (711, 712, 346) have spread their fronts to cover the sectors of those divs which were withdrawn. In the North, 5 Para Div appears to be in the LEIDEN area with Div TETTAU possibly to the East of it. There are also reported to be tps in defensive posns along the sea coast. There have been unconfirmed reports of tanks NW of DOORN but no further indications of what additional tps might be in res posns. In view of his pressing need for inf on other fronts this figure is not likely to be very high.

For the time being the present river line provides the enemy with a good position on which to hold any thrust through HOLLAND to the North German plain. Although not fortified to the same extent as the IJSSEL, the NEDER RIJN and WAAL are more difficult obstacles for the attacker and now with the flooding of the island he has increased the obstacle in front of the one sector where he most feared an attack.

There has been a report from what is believed to be a reliable source that the HQ of Gen CHRISTIANSEN, C in C NETHERLANDS has been disbanded and its comd taken over by a KORUCK (HQ Army L of C Area). Even if this is true it contributes little to the unravelling of the mystery of the Higher Comd in HOLLAND from the ARNHEM sector to the sea. The front from ARNHEM South to ROERMOND (West of DUSSELDORF) is held by First Para Army under Gen SCHLEMM who comd 1 Para Div in ITALY. It is not yet known what other Army may form part of the reported Army Gp (H or North) under Gen STUDENT. STUDENT, it will be remembered, was the man who planned and executed the invasion of CRETE.

Total PW figures for the Allied Armies were published recently. From 6 Jun to 30 Nov 741,373 Wehrmacht and SS prisoners passed through Allied hands. Of these approx 118,000 passed through First Cdn Army and 80,000 through 2 Cdn Corps channels.
(Source: 2 Cdn Corps Int Sum)

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C. W. H. Bennett
for (PW Bennett) Lt Col
GS - 2 Cdn Inf Div

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GS 2 Cdn Inf Div
6 Dec 44

2 CDN INF DIV INT SUMMARY NO 21

PART II

1 SHORT AND LONG TERM GERMAN GUERILLA AND UNDERGROUND RESISTANCE

The success of German plans to maintain Nazi Ideology, after the cessation of organized resistance by the German Armed Forces will depend mainly on the nature and extent of the Allied victory, on German morale at the time of Germany's defeat and on post-war conditions in Germany. It is advisable at the present juncture to examine the forms which both short and long term attempts to offer resistance to the Allied occupation of Germany may take.

It is assumed that we are dealing with four probable stages of future ops against the Nazis:

- (a) Up to the time when the OKW loses control of the battle (this loss of control may be spread over a considerable period);
- (b) From then on to the end of isolated mil resistance;
- (c) A subsequent period of sporadic localized activity by individuals and possibly, in suitable areas, by small bands of proscribed Nazis;
- (d) A period in the more distant future marked by the emergence of a nationalist mov, fostered underground by Nazi elements who may be abetted by strongly nationalist, but not necessarily Nazi, individuals. This will show its head only when it has grown to be a thriving child and if economic and political conditions are ripe for it to flourish.

The first three stages outlined above represent a policy of short term resistance and the last named a long term policy. They may overlap if, for example, resistance ceases on one front and not on another. The last stage, however, is unlikely to be realized for a matter of perhaps years, but may eventually prove the most dangerous.

Factors affecting possible German guerilla resistance:

Apart from the effectiveness of Allied counter-measures, there are three main considerations; the German attitude towards occupation, supply questions and topography.

The German attitude towards occupation:

On the one hand, diehard members of the Nazi organizations will certainly want to resist the Allied occupation unless they have orders to the contrary, issued because of a long-term policy. A ruthless scorched earth policy will doubtless be ordered, even though it may be Nazi policy in other ways to lie doggo at first

There are two main factors which we must consider in assessing the extent of anti-Allied feeling in Germany at any given period of the occupation. They are:

- (a) Anti-Allied feeling resulting from mil ops.
- (b) Anti-Allied feeling resulting from the Allied occupation.

Under heading (a) it is noteworthy that the most likely cause for such feeling, viz Allied bombing of German cities, seems to

have produced in reality very little Anti-Allied feeling; this is due partly to a wide realization that the Germans were responsible for the first bombing of cities and partly to a widespread feeling (which Nazi propaganda has failed to eradicate) that the British and Americans fight fairly.

Under (b) we must consider the effect of the various measures the occupying powers will be forced to adopt to keep control in the early stages of the occupation. Against whatever benefits or improvements we are able to bring about in conditions in Germany (removing Gestapo control, providing adequate sups of food, clothing, fuel etc) we must weigh the disadvantages in German eyes of our occupation, some of which will magnify themselves with the course of time. These will be:-

- (i) The mere fact that Germany is occupied.
- (ii) Readjustment of bdys (incl such possibilities as annexation of territory to indemnify, for example, HOLLAND and POLAND).
- (iii) Punishment of war criminals: relatives are bound to bear animosity.
- (iv) Allied efforts to re-educate Germany.
- (v) The necessary penetration of all spheres of German life by the Allies in order to prevent the rebirth of German aggression.
- (vi) The prolonged use of German PW or conscripted German labour for reconstruction in Allied territories. (In connection with this it is suggested that a useful deterrent to resisters in Germany would be the threat of being conscripted for labour to replace repatriated German PW: the release of selected PW at suitable times would also help the Allied cause).
- (vii) Possible transfer of population from ceded territories.
- (viii) Any other unavoidable troubles (eg economic difficulties such as unemployment) which the Nazis will be quick to exploit and even foster as a basis for anti-Allied propaganda.

On the other hand apathy and even hostility towards the German mil and political authorities have continued in the very small strip of Germany already occupied by us. Left-wing and other (eg Catholic) opposition elements will undoubtedly inform against deeply compromised Nazis. How large a proportion of the population comes into the category of such opposition elements is, however, an unknown factor. On the growing body of evidence supplied by industrial workers combed out from industry for mil service, it seems possible that we may find it a large and possibly, even a decisive factor, but it would be most inadvisable to work on such a hypothesis.

If, the reception of the Allies is generally friendly, not only informing but active assistance may become very strong possibilities thus limiting sharply the Nazis' guerilla potential. The attitude of the would-be friendly Germans will be largely conditioned by the treatment and protection meted out to them by the United Nations, as well as by the speed and thoroughness with which resistance is checked.

Cautions

- (a) If guerilla warfare has been carefully prepared, the organized bands will endeavour to coerce the population into assisting them both actively and with sups and int and may encounter some success in this.

- (b) Germans who are prepared to co-operate with the allies, though now held in check by HIMMLER's rigid control, may, when this control weakens, want to take active steps against the bands, thus compelling us to decide for or against arming them.
- (c) If the Nazi leadership considers that the situation will develop rapidly to their disadvantage, Party members will undoubtedly be ordered to "take to the woods". This will simplify the problem, at least to the extent of separating the black sheep from the rest, from the beginning.

The Nazis might allow their country to be occupied without initial large-scale guerilla activity but with the Nazi element well concealed underground (with its finances secured). This Nazi element would then continue the surreptitious schooling of its many fanatical adherents, proscribed or otherwise, and the cultivation of the Hitler legend; this would be in preparation for the day when there will be sufficient discontent to cause certain secs of the public to want the "good old days" back again. (It may be noted that the Weimer Republic was undermined by the German-Nationalist Party, which was avowedly monarchist, more than by any other political party).

The disadvantage of such a long term policy - and the Nazi leadership must realize this - is the uncertainty as to how many Nazi can contrive to go underground to save the Movement. If the German people becomes, or can be made, thoroughly aware of the corruption which has been practised in the Nazi name, then there is little hope that the individual deep-dyed Nazi will be safe from betrayal or lynching if he does not "take to the woods".

If the assumption is correct that the bulk of the German people is in fact opening its eyes to Nazi shortcomings, then the development of a long-term underground mov will be hampered from the outset. At the same time the Party might be compelled willy-nilly to follow the less advantageous path of organized large-scale guerilla resistance from the first days of Allied occupation. To this end, the Nazis will be quick to exploit any chaos following our occupation and encourage it when they can no longer hope to maintain control themselves.

Caution:

The disillusionment of many Germans with the Nazi regime is rather with its lack of success than with its lack of moral sense. Basically they will remain nationalist and aggressively militarist at heart.

Supply

The maint of guerilla forces depends in the main on the sup of manpower and of arms and eqpt.

Manpower

- (a) It may well be found that the only people in Germany prepared to undertake immediate guerilla activity are those who are so incriminated as Nazis that they can only save themselves from Allied retribution or local lynching by disappearing. This incriminated class is by no means small and may be swelled by fanatical Nazi believers, especially amongst the youth.
- (b) If the Nazis wage open guerilla warfare from the outset, they can hope for little replacement in manpower. The Yugoslav, Russian and French, etc, patriots were constantly reinforced by local people who had been persecuted or who translated hope into action as the war developed. If we can contrive to restore reasonable order in Germany it will be more acceptable

than the regime obtaining at present and therefore, once the initial sorting of black from white sheep is concluded, there should be no immediate flow of recruits to any German guerilla mov.

- (c) This does not alter the possibility of a recrudescence of German nationalist activity at a very much later date as a result of Nazi long-term planning.

Arms and Eqpt

Unless the Nazi guerillas have a highly organized sup system for arms and mil eqpt, their sups of these arts are entirely expendable: every round fired is irreplaceable. There is a possibility that large dumps have been hidden away and that underground factories have been prepared for the production of armaments. But even the large dumps can have only an expendable value and the underground factories are dependant on their own stores of irreplaceable raw materials. Moreover, dumps and factories are static and the essence of successful guerilla activity is mobility. Structural preparations in the SOUTH which are most suspicious are to be seen on the Northern slope of the Alps roughly between BREGENZ in the WEST and SALZBURG in the EAST. These preparations, however, seem to be on too large a scale to be concerned with dumps for guerilla warfare: they seem to pt to preparations for the housing underground of industrial undertakings, and are not necessarily connected with long-term resistance planning.

It was the hope of allied aid and eventual liberation which sustained the morale of the European resisters and it was the continued delivery of such aid which made possible the reforming of the continually dispersed resistance bands. Such help and hope will not be forthcoming to the German resisters.

Caution

- (a) The European resistance mov helped itself largely to German weapons and eqpt, not only in battle but by raiding dumps and bribing sentries and L of C tps. Much of the slackness of sentries and the corruptibility of the tps, many of them non-Germans, is due to apathy and passive anti-Nazi feeling on the part of the individuals. This should not occur under Allied occupation but it is a pt which needs watching.
- (b) The unofficial Freikorps mov of 1919/23, which offers in some respects a model for possible German resisters (especially as so many of the present leaders of Germany were concerned in it), was throughout supplied and paid by official Reichswehr. A quick and thorough disarmament and dismemberment of the German Army is therefore essential.

(Source: MI 14)

2 FIRST CONTACT WITH THE VOLKSSTURM

The following is a summary of all infm gained by one Div on its first encounter with the German Volkssturm in the battle of METZ. Since this type of militia will doubtlessly be met frequently during the Allied adv through GERMANY, it may prove useful to note at this time the methods of its activation and commitment, as gathered from captured documents and PW statements.

As previous infm indicates, the Volkssturm appears to be organized in regions which correspond to the "Gaue" (Regional divs in GERMANY) of the Nazi Party. Thus, the agency responsible for the activation and emp of the Volkssturm was a HQ under the title of "Volkssturm Gau Westmark". The branch which was responsible for the Volkssturm around METZ was the HQ of the

local Kreis, the equivalent to a county, probably comprising a gp of small communities around METZ.

Registration of all men between the ages of 16 and 60 was made at the local Mayors' offices on 1 Nov. Men who were working on fortifications during the time appointed for registration were excused from appearing personally, but had to be represented by their wives or parents.

Four days after the first registration the men were ordered to report for induction by order of Kreis HQ. Induction was again held at the Mayors' offices, and the order incl the following instrs for the future militiamen.

- (a) Recruits were to report on 5 Nov, and to be considered Volkssturm members from that date.
- (b) Report any change of address immediately to Kreis Volkssturm HQ.
- (c) Do not change police registration. (Since men continue to be residents of the same district and will only be part-time soldiers, their status, as far as police records are concerned, remains unchanged).
- (d) In case of sickness on day of induction, Kreis Volkssturm HQ must be notified, with enclosure of physician's certificate.
- (e) When Volkssturm member is drafted into Wehrmacht, Volkssturm membership automatically ceases.
- (f) Recruits will bring: Uniform or fd clothing, pack, blanket, mess kit, canteen, etc.
- (g) Whenever possible, any of the following weapons will be brought: Pistol, rifle, machine pistol, or any captured weapons.
- (h) Failure to report involves disciplinary punishment.

Prior to induction, lists of eligible men were drawn up by separate communities from ration lists. Separate lists were made of German nationals, Lorrainers, and "stateless" persons, eg persons who had lost their citizenship rights in any state for some reason. Only Poles were excluded from Volkssturm service.

Certain individuals who were working full time in essential key jobs may have been exempted from Volkssturm duty. One request for such exemption claims the importance of a skilled mech in repairing all kinds of vital farm machinery. Action taken by the Party branch to which the request was directed is not known.

Members were sworn into the Volkssturm one week after their induction. On the same day at 1300 hrs all members had to report for work on fortifications. Failure to report implied desertion and made any offender liable to arrest and "most severe punishment".

On 17 Nov, the Volkssturm was identified for the first time on the front, in the form of a recce patrol consisting of members from all component units. According to PW statements, the organization incl four coys totalling 400 - 500 men. They were armed with obsolete CFrench carbines; some of the men had German rifles, but lacked amn for them. Their uniform consisted of reg German trousers and blouses, without collar and national insignia, fd caps without visor, shoes or boots, and Italian full-length overcoats, plus an armband with the lettering: "Deutscher Volkssturm Wehrmacht".

On 18 Nov, 4 Coy was encountered in the line. According to PW statements, the men had received about 10 hrs trg over a period of two weeks, and some of them did not even know how to load a rifle. Aware of their poor trg, the men did their jobs unwillingly, and morale was definitely low. Of the original str of approx 100 men, only 26 reported for duty when the unit was alerted for action.

On 20 Nov, some 17-year-olds were captured who had been sent to METZ about two weeks previously from SILESIA, WESTPHALIA, BOHEMIA and SAARBRUCKEN for the purpose of improving the town's defs. Upon arrival, however, they were immediately incorporated into the Volkssturm. They were all members of the HITLER YOUTH, and were still wearing HITLER YOUTH uniforms when captured. Apparently, at the last moment even railway workers and clerks working for the German Government were conscripted into the Volkssturm.

While the methods of recruiting for the Volkssturm will probably be similar to those described above, the combat efficiency of its units here are obviously influenced by the short period of time between the fm of the units and their commitment. Ordinarily, Volkssturm tps would come under the direct cmd of the Wehrmacht cmd in their sector. According to the Cmd of METZ Colonel Konstantin MAYER who cmd all German tps in the METZ area, and who was captured by this div 20 Nov, the failure of the Volkssturm to resist more effectively in this sector was due to the fact that it had not been fully organized. Volkssturm fms which will be met in the future will no doubt have had more time in which to become acquainted with their duties, and therefore offer stronger resistance.

As had been seen in the Volkssturm units in this sector, eqpt will probably be improvised, depending on what clothing and weapons the Wehrmacht can spare in each case. Probably the only item of uniform which will remain standard is the armband. With the increasing shortage of weapons and amm in the German armed forces, it is doubtful if the Volkssturm will be able to obtain much in the way of modern arms, and that it will probably be committed, as here, as a last resort, in order to screen more valuable tps, and allow one more "strategic retreat".

NOTE: Second Army Int Summary dated 17 Nov 44 contains an account of the Volkssturm given by PW captured in the HUERTGEN area which largely confirms the infm given above. According to them control of the Volkssturm is vested in the hands of the Gauleiters. The channels of cmd from the Gauleiter are through the Kreisleiter. The Blockleiter is also responsible, in addition to all his other duties, incl that of Air Raid Warden, for the recruit- of personnel. SA and Party officials comprise the offrs' corps and the SA is in charge of trg.

Uniforms have not so far been generally issued. According to the PW most members of the Volkssturm are demanding uniforms and they openly admit they would refuse to fight in civ clothes.

Proclamations posted in the city of DUSSELDORF stated that the Volkssturm would be used for the following purposes:

- (a) To relieve front line units for a certain period of time permitting those units to rest and refit.
- (b) To strengthen certain sectors in the front line.
- (c) To defend German cities to the last man and the last house.

- 7 -

Sufficient rifles are supposed to be available for the Volksturm but party officials issued rifles only to those people whom they consider to be trustworthy. Trg hrs have been fixed at a three-hr period during the week and 8 hrs on a Sun at which many members are already grumbling.

(Source: Third US Army)

3 TAILPIECES

(a) Documents

Headquarters LXIV Corps
15 Oct 44

G-3 (1a) Section
To: 716 Infantry Division

According to infm received from HQ Nineteenth Army, the 2nd Pl of 716 AA Coy cannot be found in the Army area. No order, therefore, can be given for the pl to revert to its unit.

For the Commanding General,
the Chief of Staff
signed (illegible)

(b) Prisoners of War

(i) The Speech

A new version of Baldur von SCHIRACH's dressing-room speech to the departing 183 Volksgrenadier Division has been given by prisoners of war interrogated at Second Army.

"... how I wish I could go with you" (laughter)

"... if only I were not held back by duty" (loud laughter)

"... see, I am weeping" (uproar)

(ii) Fwd Observation

One prisoner of war suggested that since he was a Beobachter (fwd observation offr) in a Volksgrenadier division, he should be known as a "Völkischer Beobachter"...

JWH/JEM