Wir bearing.

SECRET 7 Mai 45

Copy No

5 CDN INF BDE CONFIRMATORY CRDER NO 2

THE CAPTURE OF XANTEN AND THE HIGH GROUND TO THE SE

INFM

- l. Enemy As contained in int summaries, isums, def overprints and air photos already issued.
- 2. Own tps 2 Cdn Inf Div and att tps and 129 Inf Bde Gp of 43 (WE3SEK) Inf Div sp by corps arty will take part in the op.
 - 5 Cdn Inf Bde will have under comd for the op:

10 can 71 Am.
"C" sqn 27 Gdn Armd Regt

and, in sp:

one tp Tlails - 22 Dgns
one half "A" sqn - Fife and Forfar Yeo
one sqn Kangaroos
20 Cdn A tk Bty · RCA
"A" Coy Tor Scots (MG)
"D" Coy Tor Scots (MG)
7 Cdn Fd Coy RCE
seven Fd Regts RCA
four Med Regts RCA

4 Cdn Inf Bde and 129 Inf Bde re attacking to capture XaNTEN.

4 Cdn Inf Bde objectives, FUFs & SLS, as per trace "Y" att.

INTENTION

3.

5 Cdn Inf Bde will capture and hold high grd 125393 - 125404 - 117399 - 120392.

METHOD

The attack will be in 2 phases.

- Phase I R DE MAIS carried in Kangaroos and sp by tks and flails will move by RED ROTTE on objectives as shown on trace "TO"
- Phase II RHC move by march route with vers on RIGH ROUTE; and on completion of R DW MAIS tasks will move through them on to objectives as shown on trace "X". HAYMARLET 3 will be exploited but not necessarily half.

- 4. Assembly areas, FUPs, SLs, objectives see trace "Z" att.
- 5. Routes See trace "P" att.
- 6. Exploitation on completion of RHC task the res coy will exploit fwd astride rd 129395 to 132380 to explore the crossings of the canal at 133380 and 131378.
- 7. Arty- Fire plan as issued separately.
- 8. Atk (a) One tp 17 pdrs (SP) will be in sp, and move with R DE MAIS on RED route.

 Rep 20 A tk Bty will report with wireless set to RHC for later employment.
 - (b) Remainder of 20 \mbox{A} tk Bty on call from Bde to move fwd on BLACK route.
- 9. Engrs Development of rds under arrangements CRE 2 Cdn Inf Div.
- 10. Kangaroos In sp of R DE MAIS.
- 11. Tks In initial stages to sp R DE MAIS on to objective then to move to hull down posns area 114402 to sp Crocodiles and provide right flank protection during attack by RHC.
- 12. Crocodiles In sp RHC.
- 13. Flails In sp R DE Mails for move from assembly area to SL.
- on completion of 4 Cdn Inf Bde task, "D" Coy
 Tor Scots (MG) will move with "F" Ech 4 Cdn Inf
 Bde to provide right flank protection on EAST side
 of FOREST DIE HEES.
- 15. 4.2" Mortars On completion of 4 Cdn Inf Bde task one pl will sp R DE MAIS and RHC.

ADM.

- 16. PW Cage 072407
- 17. <u>CCP</u> 083416.

INTERCOMN

- 18. Wireless Normal
- 19. Bde HQ 068414
- 20. Code Names See traces "X" and "Z" att.

21. Timings - H hr and opening of barrage:

- (a) R DE Mais by order of BDE COMD code word Saturn.
- (b) RHC by order of BDE COMD code word MOON.


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
(J.M. Delamere) Major B.M. - 5 Cdn Inf Bde

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R de Mais	2 - 3 (Spare copy for
Calg Highrs	Kangaroo Sqn)
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5 Fd Regt RCA	8 - 9
20 Cdn A tk Bty	10
Tor Scots (MG)	11 - 12 - 13
7 Cdn Fd Coy RCE	14
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5 CON INF ROE CONFIRMATORY NOTES. RACE P. P. RESON SHEET 4504



2DS(G)/ 3=0 G Int 2 Cdn Inf Div 2 Feb 45

43 Capy No.

Div Int Report No 1

On "VERITABLE"

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IV ENEMY RESERVES

 \overline{V} ENEMY AIR EFFORT

VI SECURITY

> Appx "C" - Possible Underground Resistance in GERMANY. Appx "D" - Secret Orgs in GERMANY.

MOTE:

Part IV MUST be destroyed before "D" Day. The rest of the report should only be retained as long as necessary, except for Part VI which may be kept for future ref provided there is no risk of capture.

JMR/JEM DRIS/HAND (PW Bennett) Lt Col GS, 2 Cdn Inf Div

DISTRIBUTION

Time of Signature 02 22009 As per 2 Cdn Inf Div Op Instr No 12 Conies 4 Cdn Inf Bde 5 Cdn Inf Bde 6 Cdn Inf Bde 40 to 42 43 to 47 48 to 50 51 to 55

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TOPOGRAPHY

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- 3) 2(a) The flood plains of the rivers RHEIN, MAAS and WIERS.
- The standard of the state of th a spoom bus theiflood plains ad remon you mederd at Sedo E

2000RIVER FLOOD PLAINS It at seems betavistup out were to the sold serious from both from both both to each be sold bent to the from the These are foundations the RHEIN, PMAAS and WIERS rivers. Smaller flood plains, little more than meadowland, border the smaller streams such as the KENDEL and FLEUTH.

as become independent the second consist of alluvium mainly under permanent pasture and often poorly drained. There are, however, local sandier areas of better drainage. The MAAS and RHEIN valleys are predominantly clay with the water table at or above the ground surface. Many peaty areas are found in the flood plains.

The valleys of the smakler mivers have primarily loam soil with the water table at or above the ground surface. Peat areas are NOT common, and some of the description of the RHEIN has had its river bed requestions of the wide flood plain of the RHEIN has had its river bed requestions.

larized into a single navigable channel which is now bordered by abandoned channels, marsh and backwater meadows with ditches, and, near the rivers, scrub in dead stretches of water. Abandoned river meanders marked by reed grown marsh are common.

During the period of high water in Dec due to excessive : rainfall conditions, flooding was confined almost entirely to the river flood plains.

Flooding along the RHEIN was contained by the numerous dykes. The largest areas of flooding were on both sides of the river near GRIETH A O5 and WEST of GRIETHAUSEN E 95 with otherwise almost continuous flooding to the winter dykes from WESSEL A 24 to NIJ-MEGEN E 78.

The winter flooding has, with the drop in river levels, receded and the rivers are now flowing in their regular channels. The whole of the previously flooded areas, however, is now mucky and saturated with scattered pools of water in shallow depressions.

Cover is generally scattered and discontinuous, the best cover being found in the compact villages surrounded by orchards.

There are no outstanding viewpoints on the flood plains, but the higher ground on either side gives some observation. The best observation pts are church towers and other high buildings in the towns and villages.

THE LOW PLAINS

Except for small patches of peat and a few small loam river valleys the whole of the area between the MAAS and the WAAL as far SOUTH as KEMPEN A 0808 is predominantly sandy and gravelly. Excepting the larger wooded areas such as the REICHSWALD and the HOCHWALD, the area is one of low plains with considerable areas of plain shallow valleys with a few low hills. A large portion of the area is arable but there are many small woods. Except for the rugged terrain in the larger forests the land is gently rolling with the monotonous landscape broken by numerous small woods.

70

The REICHSVALD forest is mainly coniferous with an inner belt of deciduous growth. Large patches (totalling about 15% of the forest) have been cut clear with little or no attempt at replanting. These areas are now covered with a low scrub growth. On the EASTERN side there is said to have been much replanting recently.

CIEVE to GALGENSTEEG E8154. A height of land also follows the line of the HOCHWALD and BALBERGER forests. The area NORTH of KEVELAER E 9632 is broken by numerous small low hills and woods.

Mov over the cultivated areas is interrupted only by occasional tree lined fds and rises of ground and small ditches along the fds. The rolling nature of the country and frequent small woods make covered approaches possible. Except for small peaty areas, going must be considered as fairly good to good. In the predominantly wooded areas mov off the rds must be considered as most difficult.

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There is generally an abundance of cover in the scattered woods and forest areas under average conditions. In winter, the absence of leaves in the deciduous woods and the gen absence of undergrowth has to some extent increased vulnerability to ground and air observation in these areas, end to avel

The view is obstructed by the numerous small woods and the undulating nature of the country. The prominent land features are nearly all wooded. The add to mining book to the country are nearly all wooded. The add to mining book to the country are nearly all wooded. The add to mining book to the country are the country and the country are the country are the country. The prominent land features are the country are the country.

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II - DEFENCES

- 1 The defensive system of the 'VERITABLE' area presents three main features:
 - (a) The construction of three principal lines of def, namely the

Fwd Line SIEGFRIED Line HOCHWALD "Layback".

- The apparent sub-division of the area enclosed by the principal lines of def into self-contained defensive "boxes". The transformation of towns and villages into strong pts.
- (c)

FWD LINE

The present enemy posns are really strong outposts to the main SIEGFRIED defs and are being manned in str.

These outposts are organized in two lines. In the first, depth from outposts to rear coys is about 2000 yds and an average bn front is 1500 yds.

The most weakly held sector is NORTH of the rd NIJMEGEN - CLEVE 9055 (one Bn from ERLEKOM 7862 to BAD WYLER 7659), the most strongly held the KIEKBERG woods 7451, and WYLER 7858.

Many of the enemy's posns are in woods and houses. All rds running at right angles to the front are held in considerable depth, especially the main rd WYLER - KRANENBURG.

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3 SIEGFRIED LINE

Superstanding The SIEGFRIED Line lies some 3 kilometres further to the EAST of the enemy's fwd posns, Besides the many pillboxes and concrete bunkers which were constructed a number of yrs ago and some of which are no longer evident in air photos, the enemy has constructed further fd works to strengthen those already in existence to cope with a possible attack in this sector,

The present Line includes the high ground in squares 8454 and 8455, and continues slightly NE and WORTH as far as 847567. Recently a continuous line of trenches has been dug to connect the Northern extremity with the ALTER RHEIN at 873607. Details of the def system are best seen on the defloverprints, a revised edition of which will be issued later.

It became evident from fairly recent air photos that defs exist in the REICHSWALD itself linking up the A tk ditch and fd posns with those that enter the Southern edge at 829485. In addition another series of diggings has been begun to link up the CLEVE defs with the R NIERS roughly along the line of the 87 Easting. The Southern half appears to be fairly advanced and consists of two rows of trenches,

An interesting development in the past two months is that a def line has been constructed running along the 93 Easting between CLEVE, BEDBURG 9252 and GOCH. This line, consisting of two rows of ditches, with an incomplete stretch of A tk ditch between, ties in with the defs running along the Northern and Southern edges of the Forest and the SIEGFRIED Line making the REICHSWALD a self-contained centre of resistance.

13. HOCHWALD "LAY-BACK"

This, too, is a recently constructed defensive line which is situated along the undulating ground roughly 10 kilometres EAST of the REICHSWALD Forest. It runs from the left bank of the RHINE opposite REES 0752 down to 0446 where it continues SOUTH past the WEST edge of the HOCHWALD Forest towards GELDERN 0125.

This line has some unusual features. Firstly it consists of two and sometimes three, lines of continuous trenches, between 600 and 1000 yds apart. Secondly there are two almost continuous belts of wire, one in front of each main trench line. Thirdly the Northern section between NIEDER MORMIER 0750 and the HOCHWALD is protected by an almost continuous minebelt in front of the Western line of wire and by what may be the beginning of a similar minebelt between the A tk ditch and the Eastern line of trenches. Incidentally these three features, though in a less developed form, are found also in the CLEVE - BEDBURG - GOCH line.

The main system of def may now be regarded as complete. The striking feature of recent work is that, instead of simply elaborating and strengthening the def lines, it apparently transforms their character. The principle appears no longer to be that of "def line", but "def net". The whole area is, in fact, being split up into a series of self-contained boxes enclosed by trenches with, in many cases, stretches of A tk ditch or river. The intention would seem to be that each box will have a grn committed to stay there until the end, purchasing time, if nothing else. It is doubtful if there are enough tps to provide adequate grns for all these boxes. One main defensive box taking shape is KRANENBURG - WYLER - BRUUK 7752. Fitting into this system of boxes is the transformation of townsinto strong pts defended by elaborate trenchworks and A tk ditches. Chief of these are CLEVE, GOCH, WEEZE 9337, KEVELAER 9362, UDEM 9842.

5 WYLER AND DEN HEUVEL FEATURES

The WYLER strong pt is one of the strongest links in the enemy's defensive net. It consists of weapon pits, dugouts covered with timbers and earth, and MG emplacement, connected by an extensive system of comm trenches. The area appears to be laid out for allowed def, the flanks being protected to some extent by the WYLER MEER on the NORTH and an incomplete A tk ditch along the SOUTH side. The EAST side is bounded by a stream and a stretch of marshy ground There do NOT appear to be any concrete pillboxes although some of the houses may have been reinforced for protection.

The DEN HEUVEL posn is much weaker than the WYLER one and, in itself, has less depth. However, it is linked by a single commuterench to another small defended locality 700 yds to the rear. This in turn is connected with a gp of occupied houses around 785572. These have a row of LMG posns along the SW side.

These three posns form a tight triangular defensive system astride the main rd to KRANENBERG. The main str of this posn lies in the siting of its weapons. It consists almost entirely of ordinary fd works with no concrete as in the SIEGFRIED Line further back, little wire, and only the normal allotment of inf weapons.

ENEMY ARTY

The most recent estimate of enemy gun str is as follows:

E TO B A	Fd, Med, or Fd, Med, or Hy Btys Hy guns	Hy AA Guns
REICHSWALD MILLINGEN	C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C	25
Total DUIVEN ZAND	18 = 12	O.
Total	2.4 accessation	Enterior con enterior con enterior con enterior con enterior con enterior con enterior enteri

Thus the enemy has in posm now 72 guns (excl AA) in the WERITABLE area, and a further 24 guns NORTH of the R WAAL. Some of these could fire, and the others could be quickly moved to fire, on the VERITABLE area. Incl Hy AA the maximum estimated number of guns capable of firing on the VERITABLE area is 114.

000/3

The guns SOUTH of the R WAAL consist of the div arty of 84 Piv, which normally should comprise 36 fd and 12 med guns. The remainder might be accounted for by two GHQ btys, one of which could be 1505 Army Fortress Arty Bty, formerly located further SOUTH in the 180 Div sector, from where it is known to have moved. I Para Army Arty Bty has been suggested as the other bty. This is quite possible but there is no positive evidence for this conclusion.

Inf Guns - If org in the old manner, 1051 GR has 6 lt (7.5 cm) inf guns and 2 hy (15 cm) inf guns deployed in the regt area. If org on the Volksgrenadier model, it has 12 - 7.5 cm inf guns (4 in each bn, 4 in 13 Coy).

A th - Nothing is known of the A th layout in the 84 Div sector, except for one or two small clues. A PW, who was formerly a member of 20 A th Rft & Trg Unit at KRANENBERG, stated that he had been sent to II/306 West Unit as an inf rft and that his unit had returned to GERMANY to be equipped with SP guns. This is unlikely to be a div unit. If 84 Div has an A th unit, which seems probable, it may resemble the A th unit of a Volksgrenadier Div, which contains:

A tk Coy Aslt Gun Bn AA Coy 9 x 7.5 cm A tk guns 14 x 7.5 cm As1t guns 9 x 3.7 cm AA guns

Obviously, the weapons mentioned above will be spread along the div sector and only a small proportion will have to be dealt with on our front.

NEW - A preliminary report just received indicates that the enemy now has some 21 cm nebelwerfers in the KRANENBERG area. It is possible that a bty may have been moved in recently.

7 NOTE:

It has been reported that an order has been issued from BERLIN that all houses in frontier areas are to have their basements strengthened and provided with loop-holes. Sniping from cellars is therefore a possible enemy tactic.

III - ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE

1 GEN

The REICHSWALD sector of the front extending from MIDDELAAR E7348 to the RHINE at E7863 is controlled by 84 Inf Div, comd by Maj Gen FIEBIG. Under its comd are 2 PARA REGT and at least two bns of BATTLE GP KATZMANN.

2 HIGHER COMD

84 Inf Piv belongs to 86 Corps whose comd is Gen von OBST-FELDER with HQ reported by civs area CALCAR AOO49. 86 Corps occupies the right sector of the front held by FIRST PARA ARMY, which is comd by Gen SCHLEMM of the GERMANY AIR FORCE. ARMY GP "H", controlling both FIRST PARA ARMY and TVENTY-FIFTH ARMY, is responsible for that portion of the VESTERN Front extending from NORTH of ROERMOND and incl NORTHERN and WESTERN HOLLAND. ARMY GP "H" is also led by a GAF soldier and former paratpr Col Gen STUDENT.

3 PISPOSITIONS

A trace of the last known enemy dispositions is att as Appx "A". A detailed account of the history and known org of 84 Inf Div and particularly its inf components is contained in 2 Cdn Inf Div Int Summary No 40 of 21 Jan 45. These notes will serve, therefore, to bring this infm up to date and to present more detailed material concerning the enemy units to be encountered in the WYLER area.

On the enemy right, holding a comparatively long bn front extending from the bend in the RHINE at E7863 to the 59 NORTHING, is believed to be the Fus Bn of 84 Div. Sp for this belief comes from the statement of PW, formerly of 36 MG Bn, which held the same bn pcsn and was dissolved to provide personnel for the rft of 1051 and 1052 GR. However, 84 Fus Bn has NOT been identified in this location and has been out of contact since 1 Jan 45, It is possible, therefore, that still another miscellaneous unit relieved 36 MG Bn and that 84 Fus Bn is being held as a div res.

Next in line to the SOUTH and immediately responsible for the WYIER area is II Bn 1051 GR. According to PW 6, 5 and 7 coys are all in fwd posns with 8 (Hy) Coy sub-allotted. This is contrary to what appears to be the practice of other bns on the REICHSWALD Front, which regularly employ two rifle coys fwd with one rifle coy and a proportion of the Hy Coy resting in immediate res. 1051 GR, like its sister regt, 1052, began ops in the area with three bns, one of which has been cannibalized to provide rfts for the other two. In addition, both regts received rfts from 36 MG Bn on its dissolution.

Left of II Bn is I Bn 1051 08 with 1 Coy right, 3 Coy left and 2 Coy in res. 1 Coy's locality only is within the area involved in this op giving a total of four rifle coys sp by MMG and 8.1 cm mortar from the Hy Coys in the WYLER area. A detailed presentation of the known org, str, weapons, etc of 1051 GR appears in Appx B at the end of Part III. It is estimated that enemy str in fwd inf will approximate 700 men in the op area.

Further to the SOUTH, although its coys have NOT been identified by contact in recent days, are believed to be the two bns of 1052 GR occupying a sector bounded approx by the 553 and 525 NONTHINGS, I En right and II Bn left.

The next two-bn sector to the SOUTH containing the outjutting of the REICHSWALD in squares 7550 and 7650 presents a more obscure picture. The most recent infm comes from a deserter of 6 coy 306 WEST UNIT captured 22 Jan who gave his coy posn as area 750507. Upsetting previous theories concerning the possible departure or removal into div res of the parent unit BATTLE GP KATZMAN, following the identification SOUTH of the REICHSVALD of ILI Bn 2 Para Regt, it now seems likely that two KATZMANN Bns are in the line with I Bn 306 WEST UNIT, still unidentified, right of II Bn as suggested in att trace at Appx "A". It is further possible that Battle Gp KATZ-NANN has become the third grenadier regt of 84 Inf Div following the

PW statement that the Div has been converted to a VOLKSGRENADIER type, for which the normal inf layout in three two-bn regts. Certainly, KATTMANN has been long enough under comd to become a logical candidate for membership in the Div.

The capture on 20 Jan 45 at 733494 of three deserters revealed the presence of 2 PARA REGT on our front under comd 84 Div. PW were from III Bn.

Further identification of I Bn in area 788427 and of II Bn in area 789397 lends credence to civ reports that the left bdy of 84 Div is as far SOUTH as the 38 NORTHING. Although the unidentified units may be available to 2 PARA Regt as sp, it seems likely that the III and II Bns, reassured by the defensive value of the R MAAS, may be stretched out to hold the entire river front from the 47 NORTHING to the left bdy with only the regt coys in sp.

4 DIV RES


The foregoing discussion indicates that the fwd area of the REICHSWALD front between the RHINE and MIDDELAAR is divided into eight bn sectors. Following are the units believed immediately available as res to the comd of 84 Inf Div.

- (a) BN BROCKENBUSCH Civ reports indicate 500 to 800 tps in the area MILLINGEN E8364 KEKERDOM E8064 NIEL E8160 DUFFEL-MARD E8760 LEUTH 8061. They are described as older men--40 and over--possibly of the LANDESSCHUETZEN variety, presently employed on defs, but undoubtedly available as inf res of low quality in an emergency.
- (b) 184 ENGR BN. This div unit has NOT been identified. However, reports of tps in KRANENBERG indicate that area as a possible location. Whatever trg they may enjoy as engrs, there is NO question, based on previous experience, that they must be regarded as potential inf res. It must be stressed the presence or existence of this unit can only be assumed.
- (c) 84 Fus Bn PW reports of "fusiliers" in the NORTHERN most bn sector of the div front are a possible clue to the location of 84 Fus Bn in the line. Strictly speaking, however, it must be regarded as unlocated and therefore a possible res, most probably hovering near its old haunts in the WYLER area.
- (d) One Bn of BATTLE GP KATZMANN An unconfirmed PW statement that Battle Gp KATZMANN contains a third bn-known by number 309-suggests the presence of a fourth res bn on the REICHSWALD front. HEKKENS, area 8347, previously reported as the scene of a small to conc is a possible location.

5 ENEMY FMNS ON FLANKS OF 84 DIV

Left - The left bdy of 84 Div is NOT yet clear. Civ reports put it as far SOUTH as BERGEN E8235, well into the sector previously believed to be 180 Divis. There are also other indications that 84 Div left bdy is on the R NIERS and that I and II Bns of 2 Para are under comd of the flanking div which from a recent identification of 1221 GR is believed to be still 180 Div in its old sector contrary to reports from the same civ source mentioned above that it had moved to the AACHEN sector.

Right - 84 Div, which has as its right bdy the R RHEIN, is flanked on the island by 2 Para Div holding a sector extending WEST to ZETTEN E6172. At present this div controls PARA REGTS 7 and 23.




TOP SECRET

Appx "B" to Part III

of Int Report No 1 2 Feb 45

1051 GR



2 STR - Personnel and Weapons

1051 GR

Combat Effectives	* ,•	I Bn 400-500	II Bn 500-550
MPs LMGs HMGs 8.1 cm Mortar Pz Faust Auto Rifles		28 24 6 6? 36	38 34 6 6? 36 75?
			000/2

QUALITY OF TPS

NORMANDY pocket and destroyed. I Bn and probably the other two bns were reformed of various and scattered elts of units, incl a high percentage of LANDESSCHUETZEN tps between the ages of 35 and 40. Since that time III Bn has been dissolved to provide rfts for I and II Bns which in addition received a small number (between 30-40) of younger rfts on the disbanding of 36 MG Bn. This strengthening, coupled with the fact that the long period of comparative inactivity on the front has provided a good opportunity for trg, undoubtedly mean that 1051 GR must now be considered of fairly good fighting quality. There is NO evidence that VOIKS-DEUTSCHE or foreigners are present in any important str.

4 MORALE

On the whole, morale must be considered good. Enemy defending have shown themselves constantly alert and patrolling has been active. Indications of poor morale come only from deserters, themselves usually poor types who tend to write down their comrades morale.

Nation Lors Report

5 PERSONALITIES

1051 GR COL KOSSACK

I En Capt KESSING
1 Coy Lt KOCH - 1 pl 2/Lt POHL
2 Coy
3 Coy Lt WILLER - 1 pl 2/Lt SCHULZ
4 Coy

II Bn Maj HARDWIG
5 Coy Lt GOGELEIN
6 Coy Lt KEUPNER
7 Coy Lt NETTEKWOEN
8 Coy Lt MUELLER

074

30.0

V = AIR APPRECIATION

AIRFDS

Airfds suitable for winter ops are available NE of a line ENSCHEDE - OSNABRUCK and in the COLOGNE area. From this pt of view, therefore, it is appreciated the GAF will be in a better posn to sp enemy ground the on this front than was the case on the AACHEN or ARDENNES fronts.

2 STR

Until recently the str of the GAF Tac Force in the WEST was estimated at 1050 SEF (single-engine-fighters) 100 SEF in "ground attack" units, 100 jet aircraft and about 100 Ju 87s, 120 night fighters were believed engaged on ground attack by night.

Of this force the following were believed disposed in the COLOGUE - ACHMER area: 600 SEF, most SEF ground attack and Ju 87 units, up to 80 jet aircraft and most of the night-fighter ground attack force.

Only 65% of the above are considered available at any one time for ops.

There is little doubt now, however, that the above strs are reduced by the shifting of forces to the EASTERN Front. This is borne out both by an increase of enemy air activity in the EAST and a decrease on the Central and Southern sectors of the WESTERN Front.

3 EMP

The GAF have tried to adopt the methods so successfully used by th! Allied Air Forces in France, but will have to operate without air superiority. The force will probably be employed as follows:

By day:

- / maximum effort by single-engined fighters to protect their fering with Allied fighter bombers.
- to find out where Allied rfts are being Intensive recce brought in (partly by jet aircraft).
- Fround attack by SEF on fwd tps when Allied aircraft NOT present on account of weather.
- (d) Ground attack on rds leading to the front (by jet aircraft). A possibility of attacks against Allied airfds in an attempt to neutralize or harass our air effort for short periods.

By night:

- Ground attack on tp concs etc in fwd areas by Me 110s, Ju 88s,
- Ju 87s and, in moonlight, by FW 190s.
 Attacks on trains, L of C.
 Attacks by long range bombers on the and other assembly pts.
 (Note: NOT more than 40 long range bombers will be serviceable (c) for this type of op).

RICENT EXPERIENCE

At NO time during the ARDENNES offensive was the enemy able to gain even local air superiority or air equality. Enemy pilots proved insufficiently trained for effective ground attack and "nightwork" was far below ALLIED standards. Moreover, experience within the past few days indicates that the GERMAN Comd PELZ, noted for the recklessness of his planning and attacks, may have been removed and that a policy involving less extravagant expenditure of aircraft may be re-introduced.

CONCLUSION

5

Therefore, although the GAF is doing its best to train and conserve pilots and aircraft for cooperation with ground forces, and is still a force to be reckoned with, its will be unable effectively to interfere with our offensive. Attacks by it may be expected by day and/or night, but these attacks, except possibly for occasional attacks by jet aircraft, will NOT have more than a pulsance value. a nuisance value.

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SECRET

Appx "D" to Part VI

of Int Report No 1 2 Feb 45

SECRET ORGS IN GERMANY

The following are names and histories of secret move in GERMANY as reported by higher HQ:

EDELWEISS PIRATES or EDELWEISS. In some areas young people themselves formed a mov in opposition to the Hitler Youth—a new development. Independent, but corroborative reports from the RUHR, COLOGNE, DRESDEN and HANOVER pt to the existence of such an org which is called in each case the EDELWEISS PIRATES. The name is taken from German Romanticism, but is at the same time an echo of Youth Leagues which flourished in GERMANY after 1918. There is no infm about the aims of the mov, but it has been ascertained that the org is strict and that every single member is bound by oath to the utmost secrecy. The GESTAPO is stated to have failed so far to penetrate this org. It is uncertain whether the EDELWEISS PIRATES are politically conscious or are merely reacting against the Hitler Youth. It is believed, however, that the members of the org are Nationalist rather than Communist and that the emphasis is on opposition to the NAZIS. Hitherto they are known only by their noc-

COMILITONES, This org is said to be anti-Hitler Youth. It was founded in 1942 and now has approx 1000 members, derived from the better-class families. The aim of the org is to eliminate all the Hitler Youth leaders and to assemble for active resistance upon arrival of Allied tps at the RHINE. This org is said to be most active in the following cities: - LUDWIGSHAVEN, MANNHEIM, FRANTEN-THAL and WORMS.

STURMSCHAREN and OSTMARKJUGEND. The STURMSCHAREN, a Catholic youth association, and the OSTMARKJUGEND are the two Austrian anti-Nazi orgs with branches in BAVARIA. A prisoner has reported that the combined membership of these two orgs exceeds 2,000,000. Their activities consist mostly of sabotaging comms.

SCHWARZE HAND. An org similar to the EDELWEISS, called the SCHWARZE HAND, is said to be active in HANOVER.

BUENDISCHE JUGEND. The WUPPERTHAL BUENDISCHE JUGEND is described by a prisoner, an alleged member, as a semi-official (?), anti-WAZI and anti-HITLER Jugend org.

ALA. In ESSEW, a student mov, known as ALA, is said to disseminate infm received from foreign broadcasting stas.

SCHWARZPARTEI. The SCHWARZPARTEI is an alleged anti-NAZI org, with HQ in THIER, which is stated to have a membership of 300,000. This org which was founded in 1942, is composed of members drawn from the middle class, especially civ servants. It is Nationalist in character and aims at the overthrow of the NAZIS and ending the war; it has no religious or labour connections. Its main activity consists in distributing clandestine news and operating an underground rly for French saboteurs.

2 COMMUNIST ORGS

9

ROTER HAHN. Many members of the "ROTER HAHN" in the RUERCE-BIET have been arrested this year by the GESTAPO.

KAMPFBUND DER FALKEN. The "KAMPFBUND DER FALKEN" in BAVARIA is said to be well org and it is reported that it should be able to furnish aux police. It has prepared lists of reliable and unreliable police in BAVARIA.

The Mark Market State of the State

CATHOLIC GPS

Catholic gps generally adopt an attitude of passive disapproval Catholic gps generally adopt an attitude of passive disapproval of the Nazis. A prisoner reports, however, the existence of a Jecret org in GERMANY known as the PW. This org is said to be an underground successor to the Catholic Youth Mov which was officially dissolved in Mar 33. It now exists as an illegal gp, receiving active sp from the Catholic Church and as prisoner claims, the Communists. Age of members ranges from 16 to 26. The PW operates in the Rhine-land and in the Western part of Westphalia. At present, members limit their activities to secret meetings, occasional sabotage on party vehs, and fights with the Hitler Jugend and other small Nazi Gps. Gps. Nazi Gps.

RHU

DD

SPORET

2DS(G)/1-1-3 GS 2 Cdn Inf Div 19 Feb 45

Herewith copy of First Cdn Army instrs regarding relations with the civ population in Cermany, for issue down to unit comds.

/drls /m DISTRIBUTION: List D (PW Bennett) Lt Col (E, 2 Cdn Inf Div

SECRET

11-1-0/0ps Main First Cdn Army 3 Feb 45

GERMANY - Relations with the Civ Population Measures to be taken to deal with Org Obstruction Subversive Behaviour, Resistance to authority, and Acts of Violence: Use of Firears

- This instr is issued for the assistance of fmn and unit comds in issuing instrs on this subject.
- Offences against Mil Government orders by individuals will normally be dealt with, irrespective of their gravity, by arrest and trial by Mil Government Court.
- Sabotage, such as deliberate attempts to interfere with essential mil installations, and collective resistance on the part of the civ population, or any sec of it, will be suppressed by force of arms. Orders as to the measures appropriate to the occasion will be issued to the comd of any det detailed for security duties. These orders will cover such cases as the pursuit of wanted criminals whom it is essential to capture alive.
- While as a gen principle NO unnecessary degree of force will be emp, nor will firearms be resorted to wantonly, the restrictions laid down in the MML, KE and KE(Can) for the acting in aid of the civ power, particularly those in regard to warnings and consultations, do NOT apply to the operating in hostile territory.
- Formed bodies will take action only on the orders of their conds.
- The instrs on the use of firearms in GERMANK at app 'A' att are for the guidance of few and unit comds in issuing instrs on the use of personal weapons by FS and counter-int personnel, individual soldiers or by small causal parties.
- The following principles, which summarize the legal posn, will be born in mind throughout:
 - (a) The wanton killing or maining of an unarmed civ is a crime against the laws of war and against Brit law, and the offender will be liable to trial by court-martial for the civ offence (murder, manslaughter or unlawful wounding.).
 - (b) The use of weapons on the civ population to enforce a mil order is only justified if compliance with the order is imperative on mil grounds, and if obedience to the order can NOT otherwise be obtained.
 - (c) The soldier need NUT, and will NOT, hesitate to protect himself by all means in his power, and, if necessary, by the personal weapons with which he is provided; and to prevent acts of violence which may imperil mil security, or interference with mil installations.

Sgd:(G E Beament) Col A/Chief of Staff Time of signature 2235 A hrs URDRLS/HAND

Appx 'A' to 11-1-0/Ops Main First Cdn Army dated 3 Feb 45

USE OF FIREARMS IN GERMANY

- . It is anticipated that during the period of occupying GERMANY and also when the occupation is complete, occasions may arise when the tps may have cause to reserve to the use of firearms for other than strictly op reasons. Instances may be as follows:-
 - (a) If attacked.
 - (b) To prevent crime.
 - (c) To effect arrest.

In order that a soldier need NOT hesitate, in an emergency, as to his legal right to use arms, the following pts will be brought to the notice of all ranks owncorned.

(a) Generally

In easily territory greater discretion is given to the use of personal peopons in dealing with the inhabitants than at home or in a friendly company. They must NOT, however, be used wantonly.

(b) Perbicularly

The fellowing circumstances justify the use of firearms:-

(1) If attacked by an armed person or persons.

(51) If attacked by an unarmed person provided he cannot otherwise be overcome.

[111] To prevent violent crime and sabotage.

- (iv) To stop a person escaping from custody or resisting or evading arrest, provided he cannot otherwise be secured.
- (c) If it is necessary to fire, fire will be aimed. In cases (b) (ii) and (b) (iv) above it will normally be sufficient to shoot to wound.

RHL IO

G Int 2 Car Inchity 20 Apr 45

Colorned Monbers of the Colored Collins

It is the intention of Mil Cov to make use of all German for hoe who are NOT objectionable, for normal police work in GERMANY dur me Allied occupation.

The will therefore be insig that individual members of the German Police forces will you backetained as pw even though they. are found carrying personal reasons, unless they have been actively resisting or impeding the Allini forces.

Certain other police personnel appear on suspect liens and Will be arrested by Counter-Int or Mil Gov perstanct.

With these exceptions ordinary members of the German Politice will be allered to remain at their posts and to continue their normal police work under Mil Gov supervision. They will imittally be disarmed of all weepons except truncheons. Later it will be permissible to restore, to those police who have been verted and soproved by Wil Gov. refles/carbines, with a maximum of ten your of awn. No automatic or semi-automatic weapons will be permitted and NO weapon of larger calibra than 7.92 am.

Other members of the German Police may be encountered in form-ed units operating under the Webrmacht cond. Such personnel will be afforded fw status. Individual members also may in error got into the FW chainels.

All German Police detained as PW will be interrogated at the Army PV cage by PW Interrogation Secs, who will decide whether they have been properly detained as PW. Those who are genuins PW will be twac through normal PW channels. Those who have been detained as PW evac through normal PW channels. Those who have been detained as PW evac through normal PW channels. Those who have been detained as PW evac through normal PW channels. Those who have been detained as PW evac through normal PW channels. Those who have been detained as PW evac through normal PW channels.

There are several varieties of German Police whose uniforms may be confused with mil uniforms. IOs, CMP, Counter-Int and Mil Gor personnel are in possession of booklets illustrating police uniforms and will be able to clarify identification of any German Police oncountered by Allied toso

(PW Bennett) Lt Col FinGS - 2 Con Inf Dir

drls/hard 13

THE TERM TOWN OF A

4 Can Inf Bde S Can Recas Regs (14CH) Tor Scot (MG) 10 Can Arma Feg 2 (A. BUE

2 Cdn FS Sec 2 Cdn Fro Coy 230/CA Det C A/Q APK Rear Div Ho Fila

APPX "A"

RESTRICTED

2DS(G)/ 3-0
G 2 Cdn Inf Div
9 Mar 45

CONTROL OF GERMAN CIVS

- The gen policy for the control of the civ population in captured areas in GERMANY is that they will remain in the areas in which they are found except where op reasons require their removal elsewhere.
- 2 This policy is designed to:
 - (a) Prevent bulk mov of refugees on rds.
 - (b) Facilitate checking by Counter Int for the arrest of suspects and the segregation of displaced persons.
 - (c) Make more difficult the mov of agents and saboteurs throughout the area.
 - (d) Minimize demands on op units for care and guarding of refugees.
- In accordance with this policy the following instrs will apply to fmns and units in 2 Cdn Corps area:
 - (a) So far as practicable civs will be left on their own farms and in their own villages and will be discouraged from moving.
 - (b) In towns and villages where for op reasons it is desirable to conc civs the unit concerned will be responsible for designating a portion of that place as a civ conc area into which all civs will be directed. The location of each conc area and an estimate of the number of civs likely to be found there will be notified to the fmn Mil Government Offr.
 - (c) Where necessary to evac civs to behind the area controlled by any fmn, arrangements will first be made with the next higher fmn for their reception. Civs will NOT be directed onto the rds towards rear areas unescorted.
 - (d) Civs who have or are suspected of committing hostile acts against our tps will be passed to the rear through PW channels accompanied by a report of the circumstances.
 - (e) Civs found moving unescorted on the rds without a Mil Government permit will be treated with suspicion.
 - (f) So far as practicable, all dealings with civs will be through Mil Government Offrs.
- The above policy and instrs are to be passed down to all units as quickly as possible. It is also the responsibility of COs to impress on all tps the fact that they are now in the midst of an enemy which normally will obey any order clearly and firmly given, but which will despise and take advantage of any weak or sympathetic attitude on our part.

/JEM DRLS/HAND

DISTRIBUTION

(PW Bennett) Lt Col GS, 2 Cdn Inf Div

List "D", less Serials 21-22-25-26

RIK

1.0.

2D/5-8 HQ 2 Cdn Inf Div 10 Apr 45

4 Cdn Inf Bde (4)
5 Cdn Inf Bde (4)
6 Cdn Inf Bde (4)
8 Cdn Recce Regt (14CH)
RCA
RCE
Tor Scot (MG)
RCASC
Meds
APM

W)

Native-born ALSATTANS and LORRAINERS forcibly drafted into the WAFFEN SS

l Herewith for your infm copies of correspondence received from 21 A Gp relative to native-born ALSATIANS and LORRAINERS forcibly drafted into the WAFFEN SS.

(AB McFarlane) Maj

HAND/DRIS /JWB for AA & QMG 2 Cdn Tnf Div

C O P Y

Subject Native-born Alsatians and Lorrainers forcibly drafted into the Waffen SS


21 A Gp/3769/71/A(PW) 28 Mar 45

HQ First Cdn Army HQ Second Army HQ L of C

The att copy of a letter from the French CGS is forwarded for such action as you may consider necessary.

It is not intended that French personnel should be treated differently to other PW, but it is obvious from the tone of the General's letter, that he is afraid of reprisals being taken against German SS Troops, and that he is anxious that the conscripted Frenchmen should be protected against the possibility of similar treatment.

(sgd) for Major-General TC Adm 21 Army Gp





Chief of General Staff for National Defense to the Commanding General Head of SHAEF Vission, Liaison

SUBJECT: Native-born Alsatians and Lorrainers forcibly drafted into the Waffen SS.

Tt has been brought to my knowledge that a great part of the 1928 to 1931 classes contingents as well as the 1946 class of the MULHOUSE draft board were forcibly incorporated by the German Authorities into the Waffen SS and that the Alsatian policemen recruited at MULHOUSE either prior to 1939 or after 1940 as well as the ARP personnel have been drafted into the same units up to the 1897 class.

The caption on the concerned Army book (Wehrpess) is as follows:

"ANGENOMMEN fur, die WAFFEN SS. GEMASS VERFG. WEHREBELSKDO V ABTIG 16 E 2 AZ 12 CLO No 05298/439 vom 31.12.43 DIENSTSTEMPEL FRGANZUNGSSTELLE WAFFEN SS SUIWEST VI"

Most probably this situation exists not only for the Alsatians of the MULHOUSE region. Similar measures have been probably taken for the whole of Alsace as well as in the "WEHREREISKOMMANDO XII" in so far as native-born Lorrainers were concerned.

I would greatly appreciate if you were to give all necessary instructions to have the Allied Armies concerned informed, so that those of our compatriots who might be captured wearing SS uniform (forcibly drafted into units, whose war methods provoked the reprobation of the civilized world, will not be confused with the Nazi fanatics.

(sgd)
Le General D'Armee A. Juin

HQ 5 Cdn Inf Bde 6 Feb 45

SELVE OF SERVER

J.

Copy No_/

5 CDN INF BDE OO NO 1

OP VERITABLE

Ref maps: 1/25000 Sheet 12 NW (LIST)

This 00 will not be taken fwd of Bn HQ and in the case of sp arms fwd of unit HQ.

INFM

1 Enemy

(a) As contained in 2 Cdn Inf Div INT report No 1 dated 2 Feb 45.

INT summaries already issued.

(c) 1/25000 def overprint already issued.

(b) The task of 70 comes under comd 30 Corps 0710004 (b) The task of 30 Corps is to destroy the enemy on the REICHSWALD front between R MAAS and R RHINE and breakthrough in a SOUTHERLY direction. Initial attack will be made by five divs:

51(H) Div

 ~ 50.5 MeV $_{\odot}$ $_{\odot}$ $_{\odot}$

53(W) Div

15(S) Div

2 Cdn Inf Div (in opening phase only)
3 Cdn Inf Div
(c) The task of 2 Cdn Inf Div is:

WHOSE STAD

(1) Continue to hold Div front as presently defined from BOXMEER 7640 to the Div bdy 770593.
(11) Destroy the enemy in the area HOCHSTRASZE 7956 DEN HEUVEL 7756 - WYLER 7858.

- (111) Cpen the rd HOLDEURN 766586 to HOCHSTRASZE 795567 and the rd from 759602 to 787572.
- (iv) Assist in every way the debauchment of the fmns passing through the Div FDLs.

I TENTION

- 5 Cdn Inf Bde will; []
 - (a) Destroy the enemy in the area HOCHSTRASZE DEN HEUVEL! 1.1.1.

ting of the business.

(b) Open the rd HOLDEURN to HOCHSTRASZE and the rd from 759602 to 787572. HE WALL THE REPORT OF THE

METHOD

Def of present sector

RHLI and RHC remain responsible for the def of 5 Cdn Inf Bde sector as presently held. Def measures will NOT be relaxed once attack commences until ordered by HQ 5 Cdn Inf Bde.

Grouping
For the op 5 Cdn Inf Bde has:

under comd:

"C" Sqn 13/18 H 18 Cdn Fd Amb

in sp:

3 Tp C Sqn 1 LOTHIANS One tp 617 Aslt Sqn 42 Aslt Regt RE three fd regts 2 Cdn Inf Div Arty 4.Cdn Med Regt Tor Scots (MG) less one MG Coy 7 Cdn Fd Coy RCE Tcl ASSU

6 Offensive Action

5 Gdn Inf Bde will attack with:

1 (S) AND E COL Lev dar RIGHT - R do Mais - Calg Highrs

- Routes to FUPs see trace X att 7
- THE REST OF THE STATE OF THE STATE OF THE FUPS OF THE LAW AND THE TOP
- 9
- 10 BDYS
- BOUNDS and OBJECTIVES see trace Y att 11 The same of the same of the same of
- 12 June Pts
 - (a) with right 227 Inf Bde track june 779566 and RICHTERS GUT 798565

11

- (b) with lett 7 cdn Inf Bde rd june 781583, rd june 788571
- Timings H hr 081030A (time when barrage moves from its opening line to its first lift.)
- 14 Fire SP
 - nd garen e model e kaj del kaj kaj (a) Arty (i) The outline Corps fire plan is as follows:

0500 - Arty preparation starts
0730 - 0740 Smoke screen starts
0740-0750 Complete silence incl PEPPER POT
0750 Arty fire recommences
0915 Smoke screen NW edge REICHSWALD starts Intense CB as a result of infm from smoke

screen
Opening line of barrage (mixed HE and smoke)
starts

Complete barrage starts 1000

H hr and first lift 1030

(ii) Trace of Corps and Div fire plans will be issued separately to bns.

(iii) Trace of concs on call - see trace Z att C. Well-Sylved Live

(b) PEPPER POT

Comd of 2 Cdn Inf Div Gp - Lt Col E G Johnson - Tor Scots

Object - to sturate with fire the ENEMY, defs within range.

(i1i)

"A" Sqn NOTTS YEO Three tps 3 Cdn L/A Regt Tor Scots (MG) less one MMG coy

Tgts - Trace of targets engaged before H hr will be (iv)

issued separately.

Tgts on call - after H nr 2 Cdn Inf Div Gp PEPPER POT reverts to in sp 5 CDN INF BDE to engage tgts of opportunity. (v)

PEPPER POT Rep - will be located at HQ 5 Cdn Inf Bde

1461

THE

15 Preliminary Movs

- (a) Adjustment of posns in Def of Sector

 In order to obtain safety from our own sp fire NO tps will be deployed beyond the 500 metre line shown in trace X att.

 Outposts will be withdrawn and the main posns adjusted so that all tps are behind the 500 metre line between O80001A and O80400A. Bns will report completion to 5 Cdn Inf Bde.
- Movs to FUPs
 All F Ech vehs being used in the attack will be fwd of the Bde rear bdy as shown on trace X att by 0806004.
- 17 TFC When Opened the route NIJMEGEN to rd june 787572 will NOT be used by 5 Cdn Inf Bde
- 18 Consolidation
 - (a) On completion of tasks bns will consolidate with:

 RIGHT
 R de Mais from incl inter Div bdy to excl 4 tk ditch
 784574

 LEFT
 Calg Highrs from incl 4 tk ditch 784574 to incl WYLER
 - (b) A tk
 (i) R de Mais one sec A tk pl to be sited area bldgs
 785567.
 - (ii) Calg Highrs one sec A tk pl sited area A tk ditch and rd crossing 784574.
 - (iii) 18 Cdn A tk Bty one tp of 17 pdrs will be posn area 756588 by 081030A on call.

4.DM

19 Instrs will be issued separately.

INTERCOMN

- 20 HQ 5 Cdn Inf Bde 748589
- 21 Comd Post 5 Cdn Inf Bde 757580
- 22 Code Names see trace Y att
- 23 Passwords (a) will be uniform throughout 30 Corps.
 - (b) list of passwords is given in appx "A" .
- 24 Wireless Normal but lines of comn will be used to the maximum.
- 25 ACK.

Time of Signature 06 2340 hrs.

(J. M. Delamere) Major B M 5 Cdn Inf Bde.

SDR/LO

Addendum

Para 18 - Consolidation

RIGHT - R de Mais

Add - Consolidation across inter bn bdy by left fwd coy (area between inter bn bdy and a tk ditch 784574) will NOT take place until so ordered by HQ 5 Cdn Inf Bde.

APPX "A"

TOP SECRET

6 Feb 45

Copy No.

issued in conjunction with 5 Cdn Inf Bde 00 No.1

PASSWORDS FOR PERIOD D DAY TILL D PLUS 6

FROM	TO boundary	CHALLENCE	REPLY
1200 hrs D - 1	1200 hrs D day	FATIER.	THAMES
1200 hrs D Day	1200 hrs D / 1	VIRG IN	SNOW
1200 hrs D / 1	1200 hrs D / 2	SILVER	RING
1200 hrs D / 2	1200 hrs D 🔏 3	JOLLY	FARMER
1200 hrs D / 3	1200 hrs D / 4	MOTHER	SUPERIOR
1200 hrs D / 4	1200 hrs D 🖊 5	SOUR	GRAPES
1200 hrs D / 5	1200 hrs D 🔏 6	SIMPLE	SIMON
	First Spare	PLUM	DUFF
	Second Spare	SHORT	ODDS

SECRET

5 Cdn Inf Bde 6 Feb 45.

DISTRIBUTION LIST

R H C		1
R de Mais		2
Calg Highrs	4	3
RHLI .		4
Tor Scot R (MG)		5 - 6
18 Cdn Fd Amb		. 7
C Sqn 13/18 H		8
20 Cdn A tk Bty		9
3 Tp C Sqn 1 LOTHIAN	3	10
617 Aslt Sqn 42 Aslt	Regt RE	11
79 Armd Div Rep		12
2 Cdn Inf Div Arty		13 - 16
4 Cdn Med Regt		17
7 Cdn Fd Coy	•	18
7 Cdn Inf Bde		19
227 Inf Bde	ą.	20
CRA's Rep		21
TCL ASSU	•	22
PHANTOM		23
Comd		24
ВМ		25
GS0 3		26
DAA & QMG	•	27
IO		28 .
War Diary	2	9-30-31
Spares		32 - 3 7
For Infm		
2 Cdn Inf Div		38

TOP SECRET


OP "VERITABLE"

TRACE "Y"

CODE NAMES, OBJECTIVES

REPORT LINES

Issued with 5 Cdn Inf



OBJECTIVES

59

PLACE NAMES	MAP REF	CODE NAME	ALTERNATI VE
DEN HEUVEL F.ARM BLDGS VOSSENDAAL LAGEWALD WYLER A/tk ditch & rd	7756 779566 776576 780577 7858	PINE BAY BIRCH ASPEN LUBLOW	QUEUE QUEEN QUARTER QUALITY
crossing Rd junc HOCHSTRASZE Blcgs RICHTERS GUT (Junc pt with 15(784574 788571 791568 785567 798565 S)Div)	OAK ELM POPLAR MAPL E CEDAR	QUAINT QUAKER QUARRY QUEST

REPORT LINES

A Tk ditch Rd Rd Rd Rd	7 665 65 - 7815 78 77 6573 - 7855 75 7805 67 - 7885 71 7915 63 - 7935 67 7965 62 - 7985 66 7795 78 - 7785 86 74584 - 787572 - 7985 65	PLYMOUTH NASH PONTIAC FORD AUBURN PACKARD CHRYSLER	QUICK QUITE QUIZ QUORUM QUOTE QUICKSTEP QUARREL
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TOPSECRET

OP "VERITABLE"


TRACE Z

Arty Concs on call,

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0 0 No I d/6 Feb 45

Ref sheet 12NW



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AMENDMENT NO I

7 Feb 45

TOP SECRET

to

Copy No_

5 ON INF BDE O O No I

OP "VERITABLE"

Amendment No I

Para 15 PRELIMINARY MOVES add (b):-

"Bns will re-occupy the main posns adjusted in accordance with sub para (a) above as quickly as possible after the barrage has moved fwd. On the left care will be exercised that no posn is occupied closer than 400 yds to the foremost enemy defended locality as indicated by the def overprint."

ACK M

Time of signature / Athrs

(J.M.Delamere) Major BM - 5 Cdn Inf Bde

DISTRIBUTION As per 0 0 No I Distribution list.