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GS 2 Cdn Inf Div
25 Nov 44

2 CDN INF DIV INT SUMMARY No 19

PART I

2) Army Gp Review of Enemy Intentions - 21 Nov 44

"The enemy had evidently decided that the main weight of the Allied attack would be directed towards the RUHR. Since the SIEGFRIED defts had already been pierced in the AACHEN sector it must have been clear to him that success would probably be exploited.

"While he has been rapidly improving the natural defts between the MAAS and the RHINE he has also brought back West of the RHINE his Sixth Panzer Army from WESTPHALIA and holds it for the moment uncommitted fwd of COLOGNE and DUSSELDORF. 1 SS Panzer Div is reported at ERKELENZ K97 in close reserve to the Rear defts; 2 SS Div is said to be at GREVENBROICH F17, perhaps with a similar role behind the Erft F17. Further South, around and South East of DUREN F14, 12 and 9 SS Panzer Divs have been reported. (Far from this crowded area Panzer Lehr has been identified in FRANCE, North East of SARREBOURG Q51 leaving only 2 Panzer Div lost for the while).

"Meantime the enemy has been trying to blunt the American attack with such local reserves as he could readily muster. He switched 47 Panzer Corps (of 9 Pz and 15 PG Divs) to the LINNICH K96 sector where now it seems 10 SS Panzer Div is joining it. 3 PG Div has been employed West of JULICH F05 and 116 Panzer fwd of DUREN. In the same way, further South, the Third US Army attack found the enemy's inf supported by four Panzer-type divs, 25 PG, 17 SS, 21 and 11 Panzer. He had thus a series of "front line Panzer" fms to stem both main Allied threats.

"It is evident, however, that he is unwilling to commit any of his five refitted shock fms until he must and until he knows quite where and preferably not piecemeal. That lesson he learned sharply in NORMANDY. He appears uncertain whether First US Army's is the main thrust or the strong flank guard of Ninth US Army. He is not yet clear whether the latter intends to thrust East towards DUSSELDORF or North East to come in with the Brit behind the paratps at VENLO. Further, he believes an airborne landing likely as ops develop. He has, however, been able to reduce one of his three worries and to have decided that a threat from NIJMEGEN is unlikely so that he has risked moving 10 SS Panzer Div South to the main battle. He can rely on adequate paratps to replace its close sp of 363 Div.

"He has found it necessary to set up another Army Gp in the North by which STUDENT can relieve MODEL of some of his worries and allow him to concentrate on the maj defts of the RUHR. STUDENT's comd, indeed its title, is not quite clear yet, but it probably comprises the old Nederlands comd of CHRISTIANSEN, von ZANGEN's Fifteenth Army and STUDENT's own old First Para Army. The Army Gp bdy presumably runs West into the ROERMOND area but its Easterly end is more difficult to guess: perhaps North of DUSSELDORF. STUDENT has adequate tps to juggle with as his front becomes more economical and for defensive tasks their type could hardly be bettered in present circumstances.

"MODEL has a stiffer proposition. A maj attack has been launched against both wings of his Army Gp and he dare shift little from the North to sp Seventh Army in its def of the SAAR.

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He has tried therefore, as in the North, to ride off the American thrusts by what he had there or immediately nearby already. These have not been enough and we have seen in the last forty eight hrs a substantial withdrawal East, coupled with the arrival in the METZIG area of some rfts, probably including armour, perhaps 2 Panzer Div. The battle in this area, however, is less vital, though METZ itself is now surrounded, than fwd of the RUHR, where the enemy has no space to sell. He can take himself back to the SIEGFRIED defs from TRIER L22 to KARLSRUHE R44 to stem the Allied momentum there, while, further South, Army Gp G may hope to hold STRASSBOURG as a fortress and the RHINE as a barrier against the French who have already by-passed BELFORT. (Note: In view of the advs yesterday and today, the last sentence is interesting).

"MODEL appears meanwhile to be using Fifth Panzer Army in the hope that it will be enough and that Sixth Panzer Army need not be committed until the Allied thrusts have pushed beyond the ROER. With two waves of Panzer fans, the one engaged and the other held ready, he is better disposed to beat off Allied attacks than the enemy has been at any time since the invasion of the West began. The str of this layout is evident; its weakness that while Army Gp B is nicely deployed the right wing of Army Gp G is gravely threatened. If the enemy may more readily yield territory South of the ARDENNES it is not unlimited, the more so because the economic value of the SAAR may not be abandoned lightly.

"In 1944 on all fronts the Germans have lost a hundred and created - or resurrected - seventy divs. Total losses are estimated to be in the neighbourhood of 1,300,000 men. On average they are producing twelve divs a month only to lose twenty. Although from a long term pt of view this is evidently suicidal, in the present type of fighting in the West, it matters less since a hastily improvised div, with a Panzer Div behind it and itself in good defensive posns in country not admitting of mobile warfare and with weather not allowing continuous fighter-bombing, can perform a useful service in gaining time.

"By the end of this year it is reckoned that perhaps as many as twenty-three further divs will have arrived on the Western front; from SCANDINAVIA five; from the new creations fourteen; and, if the front in ITALY is not stabilized by the winter, a further four gleaned from the withdrawal from the APPENNINE posn. This assumes that the present priority which lies with the West is maintained. The Eastern Front, important as it is, is still taking sec place to the def of the RUHR.

"MODEL's aim in Sep was "to gain time for the Fuehrer". In this he has succeeded perhaps beyond his own expectation, but the questions arise what the time is for and whether it is for the Fuehrer. That the production of jet-propelled aircraft and of new pre-fabricated U-boats has leapt fwd in the intervening period appears undoubted and yet it is clear that neither of these weapons can stop the Germans losing the war. Is it then to gain time to make the Allies as war-weary as the Germans themselves or because a further and more devastating weapon is being brought to birth? Time for a stalemate, time because there is no alternative or time for a comeback? And is it for the Fuehrer?

"It would seem rather that it is Hitler's associates who gain by the garnered time. Moreover, the present and efficient handling of the enemy forces on the Western front would suggest that RUNDSTADT suffers less since he resumed supreme comd in the West from intuitions from afar than during his chaotic period in NORMANDY. The war from the mil side would now seem to be in the hands of soldiers, a change making the enemy easier to understand but harder to defeat."

In view of what has been written by 21 Army Gp it is of interest to compare the view of the official German mil spokesman SERTORIUS when he referred on 21 Nov to the role of Second Brit Army in this present battle.

"The appearance of strong Brit fms in the battle of GEIL-ENKIRCHEN raises the question whether the Second Brit Army has moved its main str to the South. This does not seem likely, since it would mean that EISENHOWER has given up his basic operational plan of breaking into the plain of NORTHERN Germany. The Brit forces which are now fighting at GEIL-ENKIRCHEN may very well come from the former left wing of the Second Army whose attack against the LOWER MASS NORTH WEST of HERTOGENBOSCH was halted a fortnight ago, and into whose sector tps of the First Cdn Army have meanwhile possibly been sent.

"On the other hand, it may still be assumed that the tps which Gen DIMPSEY concentrated on the NIJMEGEN sector have not been weakened to any extent during the past few days, but are still waiting in their old posns for the order to launch a large-scale attack.

"Only when this long delayed attack has started, will it be possible to speak of a complete offensive deployment of the Allied forces' potential, and as a result to deploy all German operational reserves."

(Source: 2 Cdn Corps Int Summary)

HSCA/JEM
DRLS/HAND

21st Cdn Armd Div, Cpt
for (P Bennett) Lt Col
GS, 2 Cdn Inf Div.

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PART II

Order of Battle Notes

1 6 Para Div

Following closely upon the news that 10 SS Pz Div was moving SOUTH came reliable infm that 6 Para Div has taken its place with HQ at VELP just EAST of ARNHEM and 17 Para Regt at DIDAM 8972, the recent haunt of 10 SS. The Div has been mentioned in Summaries, but in view of our increased interest in this fmn, an attempt has been made to consolidate available infm.

Early History

6 Para Div is the ugly duckling of Gen STUDENT's comd. While the battle was going on in NORMANDY it was still forming on the SOMME, and the first of its three rifle regts FJR 16 was taken from it in Jun crisis on the Northern Russian front to be consumed at BIALYSTOK. The rest of the div was moved down in Aug to cover the Western approaches of PARIS; and from there retreated to BELGIUM and was one of the fms caught by the Americans at MONS. Its HQ was identified from a document found behind the ALBERT Canal about 7 Sep; and some other units have been identified: e.g. 6 Para A Tk Bn, and 2 Coy of 6 Para Engr Bn, formed at JOIGNY in Jun 44 with four coys each initially 200 strong. 2 PW captured SOUTH of MONS on 3 Sep stated that the div comprised an A Tk Bn, an engr bn, a sigs bn, 6 Para Arty Regt, a Projector Bn att from First Para Army, a Fd Ersatz Bn and an Einheit Reiter, consisting of stragglers from other Para units.

It seems that the Fd Replacement Bn absorbed the output of a trg school for NCO candidates at NANCY in May. 95% of them are jumpers, and it should be a better unit than the name suggests. REITER's Bn was formed at MELUN in mid-Jun from remnants at that time to hand of 3, 5, and perhaps other para divs, and consisted of four coys each of 100 men without hy weapons. The whole of the first coy and REITER himself are believed to have been captured. FJR 17 and 18 have never materialized at the front; instead the div had for inf, besides the Fd Ersatz Bn and Bn REITER, Para Lehr Regt att from First Para Army. As for arty, one PW says that all three bns of 4 Para Arty Regt also formed at LUNEVILLE in Jun 44, were att to 6 Para Div. It is not plain whether this is the same as "6 Para Arty Regt" or not.

Its main inf constituent would seem therefore to have been the HERMANN Para Lehr Regt, which includes Bn LORENZ. Prisoners state that this regt started forming in ITALY in Mar 44, was sent to NEVERS and then on 12 Jun to the mouth of the SOMME and finally to ABBEVILLE, where it was incorporated in 6 Para Div. About half the men have had jumping trg. HERMANN had a bn in CRETE which afterwards became a Lehr or experimental bn. It fought in CYRENAICA late in 41 and again in the summer of 42, and was later employed as an instructional unit and made films of parachute jumps. In the winter of 42/43 it was at DOEBERITZ, and in the spring of 1943 transferred to ORANGE. It was one of the units that took part in the rescue of MUSSOLINI from the GRAN SASSO. A sec bn of the Para Lehr Regt distinguished itself, according to a newspaper cutting, at NETTUNA at the beginning of Apr. At NEVERS the regt received assorted drafts of lower grade men, clerks, etc who had "volunteered" for combat duty. HERMANN, now Lt-Col, has been the comd throughout.

Recent Developments

Until recently the location of 6 Para Div has been obscure, and its organization remains in doubt. Regt HERMANN was identified in the GROESBEEK 7555 area on 3 Oct on the front controlled by 84 Div,

and Bn LORENZ remained in this area until relieved by 306 WEST Bn on 15 Nov. Most of Regt HERMANN has now been identified further SOUTH in the sector between VENLO and ROERMOND, under comd of 344 Div, and it is believed that it has now lost whatever affiliation it may have had with 6 Para Div. The Div has several times been reported as reforming; one report mentioned the HERMANN GOERING Barracks in BONN as the centre of this activity, and a more recent location given was COEVORDEN, V35.

Organization

In theory 6 Para Div should consist of 17 and 18 Para Regts, 13 evidently having been given up as a bad job. The presence of 17 Para Regt at DIDAM is the only clue to the present organization of the Div. It is possible that Regt HERMANN was intended to become 18 Para Regt, but was called away for more urgent duties elsewhere; it seems more likely however that a new 18 Para Regt has been formed, although it might have to concede priority to other Para Divs, notably 3 and 5. A deserter from VI Luftwaffe Bn abV on 3 Nov said his unit was in 6 Para Div, but had no further information.

When the Div fought in FRANCE it proved to have no artillery of its own, and recently a PW captured at LAMMERSDORF FOSSO from 6 Para A Tk Bn, nominally of 6 Para Div, stated that his unit was part of the reformed 5 Para Div. It is expected that the Div will eventually acquire supporting arms and services, if indeed it has not already done so.

Personnel

The Div will probably be found to contain a large proportion of young GAF personnel, well disciplined from previous service in the Luftwaffe, mostly pure German, and physically fit, but deficient in infantry training, especially fieldcraft and the tactical handling of weapons. It has been reported that Major General (Luftwaffe) PLOCHER, formerly on the staff of C-in-C Netherlands and previously Chief of Staff of a Group in the Luftwaffe, is commanding 6 Para Div. Another report by PW from Regt HERMANN suggests that HERMANN may have been promoted to command the Div.

(Source: 2 Cdn Corps Int Sum)

2

SS Corps

A PW states that 13 SS Corps was constituted by using regular Army officers who had to don SS uniforms and in many cases acknowledge SS ranks for the purpose. He further states that in the entire corps staff there are only two officers who hold regular SS ranks, SS Obergruppenführer PRIESS and his assistant Intelligence Officer. A suggestion that 12 SS Corps may be similarly constituted is contained in a report that 112 SS Corps Signals Battalion is commanded by SS SBF POCKRANDT. The German Army List of 1942 carries a Major POCKRANDT as being a Signal Officer in the Army.

(Source: 2 Cdn Corps Int Sum)

Mines

3

New Booby Trap

Something new in booby traps is in use. It is made by filling a wooden box with several egg grenades and broken glass and is set a short distance from MG positions. A potato masher grenade is inserted part way into the box through a hole in its side and the porcelain ball on the handle is attached to a wire which leads to the MG posn or a nearby fox hole. The wire is pulled at the desired moment, the potato masher grenade explodes, causes the egg grenades in the box to detonate and the broken glass particles are thrown in all directions.

Egg Grenade Booby Trap

A report from an Engr Combat Gp states the egg grenades were fastened to trees and covered with bark. A black Trip-wire att to the grenade ran down the tree and then across the path where it was fastened to another tree. The height of the wire above the ground was approx 8 ins.

(Source: 2 Cdn Corps Int Summary)

The enemy recently effectively defended a bldg by stringing concertina wire throughout all rooms on the ground floor and hooking to it booby traps which could be controlled from the basement by other wires. When a member of the attacking force entered the room or cut the concertina wire a booby trap in the room would be set off by a man in the basement. Three attacks on this bldg were repulsed, and the bldg was taken only after it had been demolished by arty fire.

(Source: 90 US Div)

On examination of a number of church spires and towers in TILBURG, which were shown in German Documents as "prepared for demolition", it was found that the staircases were choked with barbed wire. Closer examination showed that the wire was att by string to ZZ 35 igniters screwed into 200 m concealed charges.

Three other similar traps were found, which were easily detected and neutralized. German booby trap string had been used to attach the traps to the barbed wire. The door at the bottom of the staircase was booby trapped with a pull igniter. The second tower examined was wired and booby trapped in exactly the same manner. In this case, however, the staircase was narrow and spiral and at one pt the treads had been cut away for a vertical height of about 8 feet.

(Source: SA Intrep No 159)

Clay Pot Mine

A new type of mine has been reported by FUSA, accurate details of which are not yet known. It is believed to be approx 1 foot in diameter, 6 inches high, and of glazed pottery 3/4 inch thick. The mine is believed to use either a tilt or rupture igniter as one exploded when a "stick" protruding from the ground was moved.

Another report mentions that a mine made from a flower pot has been found in the GOUDA area near ROTTERDAM. The pots are manufactured in this area and then transported to another location to be filled with explosive. The hole at the base of the pot is somewhat larger than normal in order to allow the use of an unidentified igniter. The mine is employed in tall grass being placed in the ground and cam. It is believed that this is the same pot mine mentioned above.

(Source: RE Second Army)

4 Shortage of Offrs

The enemy's desperate need for offrs is shown in the following translation of a captured document from 559 Inf Div:

"1125 Inf Regt, Office of the Adjt

Nov 44

To: COs of all Regt Units, and Bn Adjts:

The following pts of gen interest were discussed at the occasion of a meeting of Div Adjts, held at Corps on 31 Oct 44:

1. 70,000 vacancies in the German Offrs' Corps must be filled. It is therefore necessary to be on the lookout for good offr ma-

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terial amongst the tps, and to hand in lists of names of likely candidates.

2. The spotting of offr material in the Volksgrenadier Divs will be taken care of by the SS.

3. In future the Volksgrenadier Divs will receive replacements preferably of the 1926/28 age gps. Only specially selected offr will be transferred to Volksgrenadier Divs.

4. All lts with six mos' experience as pl leaders must be put in comd of a coy at the earliest possible moment unless there are good reasons for the contrary, such as complete inefficiency.

5. Strict standards must be applied in the recognition of "close combat" actions. All tps decorated with the close combat medal will receive three weeks special furlough, and will then be transferred for one year as instructors into the Replacement Army.

6. There will be no further awards of combat decorations to soldiers at HQ who could be used in front line units.

7. In proposals for the award of the "German Gold Cross" the dates of the deeds of bravery have to be farther apart the higher the grade of the candidate.

8. Protestant clergymen may become front line offr.

9. In the near future a directive will be issued, according to which offr can be reduced by one grade for insufficient competence.

10. Soldiers who suffer from wounds or illness, and whose absence will considerably exceed eight weeks in the opinion of the MO, will not be included in str reports. This applies in exceptional cases, such as amputations, or illness of utmost severity.

(Source: 2 Can Corps Int Summary).

5

Enemy Int Methods

The following typical enemy instrs to a short range agent are reproduced:

- (a) Cross lines into Allied territory.
- (b) Openly approach first soldier or MP you see.
- (c) Say you escaped from German territory and wish to give valuable infm.
- (d) Ask to be taken to the nearest Comd Post (Allied soldiers will give you safe conduct past any civ travel control post set up in fwd areas).
- (e) At CP give enough plausible but gen infm to convince them of your good intentions so that they will not regard you with suspicion.
- (f) Say you will go back to Allied rear area where you have friends, but instead, circulate in Div Area, obtain unit identifications and str, gun posns, supply dump locations, etc.
- (g) Return to German territory. You will be paid and given instrs for your next "cross the lines" mission.

Short-range enemy agents using the above methods have been caught. Others are in circulation (in civ clothes, French or American uniform, clerical garb).

(Source: AFHQ Notes)

NOTE: Civs report to local CPs sometimes with genuine infm. Care should be taken to ensure they are not agents. Infm of a very gen nature should be regarded as suspicious.

1NT

SECRET

2DS(G)/ 3-0
GS 2 Cdn Inf Div
29 Nov 44

2 CDN INF DIV INT SUMMARY NO 20

PART I

ENEMY SITUATION IN THE WEST

Some Facts and Figures

(a) Str of the German Army

The present nominal str of the German Armed Forces is approx 290 divs of all types. Of these, 70 are in the WEST - the equivalent by German Army WE standards of about 35 divs. Of the nominal total of 70, 15 (or the actual equivalent of about 7) are mechanized or armd.

(b) PW since D-day

A total of 715,644 PW were taken by the Allies in the WEST between D-day and 23 Nov. Total cas for the period (PW, killed and wounded) are estimated at well over a million. The enemy has suffered 100,000 cas of all kinds in the last two weeks since the start of the present offensives.

(c) Von RUNDSTEDT's Last Mobile Reserve

The largest conc of SS Armd Divs ever assembled under one compact fd cmd (6 SS Pz Army with 1, 2, 9, 10 and 12 SS Pz Divs) stands at the moment uncommitted in def of the RUHRGEBIET. This army, between the ROER and the RHINE with its centre of gravity SOUTH of COLOGNE, is the enemy's last mobile reserve in the WEST.

Gen

The German left wing caved in fairly completely in face of the Allied offensives, but the centre, though yielding slightly, still holds firm. In the SOUTH the French attack up the BELFORT GAP reached BELFORT, MULHOUSE and the RHINE - forcing the withdrawal of two divs from the VOSGES mountain line. The Northern end of the VOSGES was likewise turned by our adv through the SAVERNE GAP to STRASBOURG. The whole of 19 Army (around STRASBOURG and SOUTH to the SWISS frontier) was thus threatened with encirclement leaving little to man the SIEGFRIED line.

WEST of COLOGNE the enemy has lost heavily and given some ground but still fights bitterly for the ROER line to keep our armies from the plain beyond. In SOUTH HOLLAND he gave ground quite readily and we advanced steadily up to the MEUSE.

Armour

Enemy armour in the WEST is now concentrated almost entirely in three areas:

(a) First Army Sector (excl TRIER to excl STRASBOURG)

In this sector guarding the SAAR the enemy has five armd or mechanized divs - all committed. They are 21 Pz, 25 PG, 17 SS PG, 11 Pz and Pz LEHR which was borrowed recently from 6 SS Pz Army and thrown in NW of STRASBOURG.

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- 2 -

(b) Fifth Pz Army Sector (excl DUSSELDORF to incl DUREN)

Here four mechanized divs have been fighting for the line of the ROER. They are 15 PG, 9 Pz, 3 PG and 116 Pz. (10 SS Pz Div which moved suddenly from ARNHEM ten days ago and was used for a short time at LINNICH is now reported to have been withdrawn and is assumed to have joined 6 SS Pz Army).

(c) 6 SS Pz Army (in reserve WEST of COLOGNE)

Five SS Pz Divs (1, 2, 9, 10 and 12) are deployed WEST of the RHINE under 1 and 2 SS Pz Corps. (2 SS Pz Corps is believed to have moved SOUTH from ARNHEM with 10 SS Pz Div). 6 SS Pz Army moved recently from its reforming area in WESTPHALIA to sp Fifth Pz Army and Seventh Army (which is in the sector excl DUREN to incl TRIER). It is far from certain that the whole of 6 SS Pz Army is yet operational. Reports describe its divs as still engaged in trg and digging and there seems to be no intention of committing them before a graver threat to the vital RUHR industries has developed.

19 Army in the VOSGES, 15 Army and 1 Para Army in HOLLAND and 7 Army in the ARDENNES have no armour whatever, though 7 Army has the sp of 6 SS Pz Army in case of a thrust NE towards BONN and COLOGNE.

Paratroops

The enemy has 5 Para Divs in the WEST (2, 3, 5, 6 and 7). 7 Para Div is committed NORTH of VENLO and 6 is believed to have relieved 10 SS Pz Div on our front. 3 Para Div moved recently from EAST HOLLAND and has been identified NORTH of AACHEN. 2 and 5 Para Divs are probably still reforming behind the IJSEL line where they serve a secondary role as reserves for First Para Army. The enemy's experience of putting half-trained para divs into the line in FRANCE is one he will avoid repeating. However, if the situation remains quiet NORTH of VENLO, they are likely to follow 3 Para Div SOUTH.

Other Inf

Von RUNDSTEDT has little inf out of the line. Every infantryman who can be found is needed for both the SAAR and RUHR sectors where the Volksgrenadiers have been burned up almost entirely and the front line arm'd divs have been left in the lurch. 15 Army in WEST HOLLAND has given up 256 and 719 Inf Divs. Of the eight divs it retains, two are probably available for use elsewhere, but these may not move farther than the IJSEL line where, at the moment, two half-formed Para Divs guard the approaches to the NORTH German Plain. Elsewhere on the Western Front the German Inf is either fully committed or in immediate reserve in vital sectors. It must be expected, therefore, that more Volksgrenadier Divs will show up, though all accounts agree that their lack of trg is proving fatal in battle.

ENEMY SITUATION IN HOLLAND

Our Left Flank

15 Army HQ is reported to have left Western HOLLAND for GERMANY. Its final destination is not known. Certainly it will be moving behind the main WEST GERMANY def belt and possibly SOUTH. At least five divs remain in Western HOLLAND. They are 346, 711, 59 and 712 in posn along the MAAS and WAAL and Div TETTAU, now believed to be in the area SOUTH of AMSTERDAM. Of the others which crossed the MAAS 256 and 719 have left the area, 85 has probably been withdrawn to GERMANY for reforming while 245 and 331 remain unaccounted for.

There is no substantial evidence yet that the enemy is thinking in terms of a withdrawal from WESTERN HOLLAND. He is withdrawing as much as he can from sectors where he does not consider himself threatened but the net result so far has been a reduction in the 15 Army reserve rather than a weakening of the actual front. If with an economical distribution of tps the enemy can keep us SOUTH of the RHINE, then his present line in HOLLAND is probably worth holding. The line of the IJssel would be a neater and more economical extension of the SIEGFRIED line but it is a far less difficult obstacle and the country EAST of it is far more suitable for ops than that NORTH of the lower RHINE.

Our Right Flank

In the MEUSE sector SOUTH of our area the enemy has carried out an orderly and inexpensive withdrawal from his bridgehead WEST of the river. He still holds the VENLO area and has small "last man, last round" pockets elsewhere along the WEST bank which are being cleared out slowly. Identifications during the op to eliminate the bridgehead have been normal. Rearguards encountered have been chiefly from 7 Para Div.

Our Own Front

Infm on enemy dispositions on our front, considered fairly complete 10 days ago, is now scanty except in the REICHSWALD sector where PW today confirmed the continued presence of 84 Inf Div immediately SOUTH of the RHINE. There has still been no recent contact with 190 Div, between 84 Div and the MEUSE, but this infm is not likely to have moved. Appx "A" to Part I of this summary outlines Order of Battle notes on 84 Div.

On the Eastern "island" front 10 SS Pz Div is now known to have pulled out completely. But it remains to be confirmed by contact that 6 Para Div has taken over the sector. On the NEDER RIJN 363 Div is reported by reliable civs to have concentrated at EDE and departed for GERMANY. This again awaits confirmation by contact. If 363 has left, another para div from the IJssel or a div from 15 Army may have relieved it.

The control of enemy divs on our front has also been obscured by recent changes. 2 SS Pz Corps has probably moved with 10 SS Pz Div to its logical place in 6 SS Pz Army. It is not known what adjustments have been made to fill the gap. The 2 Para Corps sector could be extended to take in 6 Para Div and the 15 Army bdy moved EAST to ARNHEM. On the other hand the Eastward move of 15 Army HQ suggests that Western HOLLAND may now be regarded as a Corps rather than an Army task. If this is the case, 67 or 88 Corps (from Western HOLLAND) may appear on our front. It is worth noting that 88 Corps HQ SOUTH of UTRECHT was successfully bombed today.

HSCA/JEM
DRJS/HAND

J. W. Henley Capt.
for (P Bennett) Lt Col
GS - 2 Cdn Inf Div

encl.

Time of signature 2110 hrs

Order of Battle Notes84 Inf Div
1051 GR

Two deserters from 2 Coy of I Bn 1051 GR were taken in area E760561 at 271730A. They confirmed the locations of 2 Coy in area E784556, exactly where it was believed to be, but stated that 1 Coy was on their right, NOT 3 Coy. As 3 Coy was formerly in posn on the right, it appears that the Bn has two rifle coys fwd and one in reserve relieving each other periodically. The prisoners further stated that during the night 27/28 Nov it was intended to relieve I Bn by II Bn, but since no particular signs of a relief taking place have been reported by our fwd tps, this must await confirmation. 9 Coy of III Bn was stated to be on the immediate left, whereas II Bn was formerly in that area. It is obvious therefore that 1051 GR has three bn posns, two up and one back, and that the bns take turns in reserve. The posn of 84 Fus Bn on the Regt's right flank was confirmed.

PW stated HQ I Bn was in bunkers in area of farm 78975587, and HQ 1051 GR at WASSERBURG 892577. This is rather far back for a Regt HQ, and has previously been reported as the location of Div HQ. This may be connected with the suggestion that Col KOSSACK, OC 1051 GR, has possibly been promoted to comd 84 Div as reported more than once.

I Bn has three rifle coys and a hy coy. 2 Coy has only two pls of 30 men each with MGs 42. Some rifles are of a new 1944 type with a cup discharger which does not fit the ordinary rifle 98.

According to PW, supplies arrive at KRANENBURG 8056 from DUFFLEWARD 8760 by HDT and thence go by handcart to coy posns, where they are picked up immediately after last lt.

A strong fighting patrol was planned for the end of this month to capture a PW.

1052 GR

A prisoner taken from sec posn 771611 at 280500A belonged to 3 Coy 1052 GR and stated that 2 Coy was on his right. I Bn has been in posn since 6/7 Nov and evidently relieved II Bn which must now be in reserve. Coy posns are as shown on the def overprint. I Bn now consists of 2 and 3 Coys only, 1 Coy having been dissolved as a result of losses suffered at GROESBEEK 7555, and is known as Battle Gp MITTNER. The rest of PW's sec was killed by our patrol. This bn has very little tpt and no hy weapons in sp; no WT or LT comms are available; amn is carefully conserved, OC I Bn is Capt MITTNER, OC 3 Coy is Lt LANG.

84 Fus Bn

A prisoner taken from 84 Fus Bn at 764563 who was a member of a 15-man patrol with the task of taking a PW belonged to 1 Coy of 84 Fus Bn, which he states has three coys of three pls of 3 secs. 4 Hy Coy is split up in sp of the three rifle coys which are all fwd - 2 Coy right, 1 Coy centre, 3 Coy left.

Comments

We now have an order of battle picture of the 84 Div sector between the R WAAL and the 54 Northing which is complete and comparatively up to date. The sector is divided up into nine bn areas, of which seven are fwd and two in close reserve. The two Inf

Regts of 84 Div hold the outside posns, 1051 GR left and 1052 GR right, each with two bns fwd and one back. The centre is held by 84 Fus Bn on the left and the two bns of 306 West Unit on the right. The dispositions of the other div units are not known, but the def overprint suggests posns which would be in keeping with a standard defensive layout.

Further NORTH, between the R WAAL and ARNHEM, much less is known of enemy dispositions. There are six bn areas to be filled it is reasonably certain that the most Northerly one is still held by 41 MG Bn, but it is now some time since I Bn 959 GR was last identified. The three bn areas formerly occupied by inf of 10 SS Pz Div are the outstanding question marks. The most likely assumption is that they are occupied by bns of 6 Para Div, but Fortress Units must also be kept in mind. Prisoners taken from 10 SS Pz Div further SOUTH unfortunately did not know by whom they had been relieved. The remaining bn area is believed to be held by Engr tps.

2 CDN INF DIV INT SUMMARY No 20

PART II

DON'T TALK!

Following is a translation of a document removed from a PW of 2 Coy 1051 GR, 84 Inf Div captured on our front 27 Nov 44. PW states this leaflet was distributed to all ranks within the last week. After talking freely for two hrs, PW offered the leaflet to his interrogator as a souvenir.

"Every GERMAN soldier is expected to use all means of avoiding capture. Should there be NO possibility of escape and you have the misfortune to be taken prisoner, the first rule to remember is:

DON'T TALK!

"Captured enemy documents pay tribute to the GERMAN soldier because as a prisoner he refuses to talk. He is described as patriotic, proud, cautious and under all circumstances reserved. Therefore, the enemy will try everything, be it promises of special favours, exaggerated courtesy, a play on vanity, solitary confinement, coercion or stool-pigeons to obtain infm from the prisoner.

THEREFORE:

"At the threat of capture immediately and as inconspicuously as possible destroy all written material, orders, identification cards (except paybook), messages, maps, sketches, letters, notebooks, etc.

"As a prisoner:

- 1) Proper deportment. Display a soldierly bearing before the interrogation offr; be correct, definite, modest and patriotic.
- 2) Give NO infm concerning the contents of the paybook. Neither confirm nor deny. DON'T TALK.
- 3) In reply to questions give only, name, rank, identity disc number, birth date, place of birth, home address. DON'T TALK.
- 4) Answer NO political questions. DON'T TALK.
- 5) Beware of special courtesy on the part of the enemy and particularly of any favouritism. DON'T TALK.
- 6) Do NOT confirm infm already in possession of the enemy or the reported statements of other prisoners of war. DON'T TALK.
- 7) Remain steadfast against threats. Prisoners of war who refuse to give infm may NOT, according to Art 5 of the Geneva Convention, be either threatened or insulted, nor be subjected to unpleasantness in disadvantages of any kind.
- 8) During interrogation speak only in your native tongue.
- 9) Do NOT under any circumstances try to deceive the enemy.
- 10) Be reserved in dealings with unknown prisoners. (Stool pigeons!)

- 11) Beware of conversations in closed rooms (hidden microphones).
- 12) Never give your word of honour, NOT to attempt to escape.

Even as a prisoner of war, the GERMAN soldier is bound by his oath and even without weapons, remains a fighter for the Fatherland. Every GERMAN soldier must take into consideration the fact that after his return he must give an account of his conduct while a prisoner and that he will be held responsible for proven failure to carry out his duty.

ENEMY DISORGANIZATION

47 Volksgrenadier Div

All units of the div have now been identified and detailed interrogation of the many PW captured has been carried out on the org and history of the div. PW were also able to give a good deal of infm on strs.

103 GR has been decimated and is now only a battle gp of about 60 men (Kampfgruppe SCHEERER). I Bn has suffered about 50% cas.

104 Gr is believed to be destroyed for all practical purposes. Its remnants are probably formed into a battle gp; coys are for the most part down to a str of 5 - 15 men.

115 GR appears to be the strongest unit left in the div; only its I Bn is known to have suffered any appreciable cas. 1 Coy has dix men left, 3 Coy 30 men.

Of 147 Arty Regt all guns and horses were newly issued just before the div was committed. Some guns would not fire and horses would not pull. The guns of II Bn in posn round ESCHWEILER and NOTHBERG were unable to fire because of lack of comms. All their radios were either captured or destroyed and it was impossible to lay wire because of the extremely hy arty fire. Several guns were damaged by air attack.

III Bn was misdirected to JULICH instead of to DUREN and it arrived just in time for the bombing of 16 Nov. As a result only three guns remain, all the horses to the number of 100 were killed and all sups of amn were destroyed. Of the original 60 men in the HQ Tp, only 12 were left alive, and these were later employed as inf.

147 Engr Bn of two coys each of about 120 men was committed as inf near HEUCHEN F.0047. The coys lost contact and 2 Coy suffered 50% cas.

The history of the div is one of the most interesting among inf divs since the collapse in FRANCE. It was formed in Mar 43 and was originally stationed in the CALAIS area. From there it was sent to form part of the def of PARIS, but it arrived too late. From there it was given the task of fighting a delaying action EAST of the SEINE, but was caught in the MONS pocket and destroyed in four days. Its comd Genmaj WAHLE was captured after his predecessor (GenLt ELFELD, later Comd 84 Corps) had suffered the same fate. The remnants of the div were sent back to DENMARK for reorganization.

Thus the new 47 Volksgrenadier Div was intended to rectify the bad reputation of its namesake. The new div included no foreigners and no grandfathers. It was offered the pick of German youth, including trained pilots from GOERING, trained torpedo mechanics, from DOENITZ and even a gift from GOEBBELS, some young entertainers so far exempt from mil service. Most of the NCOs were veterans of RUSSIA. The div received a large number of new recently-commissioned ofrs and the senior ofrs came with plenty of battle experience

and the medals that go with it. With all this, it also received large quantities of new eqpt. Trg was short, but pep-talks were long and numerous; "Germany must win this war, GERMANY will win this war".

The troubles of the div started shortly after it left DENMARK on 10 Nov. Some Danish patriots dynamited the rly lines at two places and the div was held up for a day. The majority of the personnel of the adv party, sent ahead to reconnoitre the posns of 12 Inf Div which they were to relieve, were captured. The bulk of the div arrived on 15 Nov but the more unlucky portions were detraining at DUREN at 1000 hrs on 16 Nov and by 1200 hrs the rly station at DUREN no longer existed.

The original plan called for 47 Volksgrenadier Div to relieve 12 Inf Div on 16 Nov, but this proved impossible due to hy Allied arty fire. Then came a series of conflicting orders. One bn was ordered to occupy a posn, but when it was already on its way, it was recalled and ordered to attack in another sector. The Regt Comds gave out one set of orders; the Div Comd gave out another set; and Corps had its own ideas.

On 18 Nov the relief of 12 Inf Div was carried out amid great confusion after the div had already suffered heavily from air attacks and arty fire. Units occupied sectors they had no time to reconnoitre - comds attempted to follow the familiar doctrine of immediate counter attack, but their tps had no idea of what forces they had opposing them. An experienced German Coy Comd, now a PW, said that his men advanced to within 50 yds of the American posns and were then met by all the fire that could be brought to bear on them. Practically the whole of the first Bn was wiped out within mins, and the number of dead almost exceeded the number of PW taken. II Bn 104 GR met a similar fate at SCHERPENSEEL and then, to add insult to injury, the German arty fired into their own lines. Comms to the rear were disrupted; Regt Comds did NOT know where their bns were and vice versa. The arty FOOs never reached the inf units and their guns were afraid to fire because of the vigil of the air forces. Lt SCHUTKOWSKI, OC 4 Coy 104 GR, said: "Not even during our worst crisis in RUSSIA did I experience such utter confusion and such drastic failure on the part of responsible German Comds." OC 1 Coy, 104 GR said: "It was all mixed up: I did not know what was going on on my right or left, or what was in front, but still I was ordered to attack". Lt LUNEN of II Bn HQ, 104 GR, commented: "You used more arty amn than we expended rifle amn".

The first few PW taken from the div were arrogant and firm believers in Nazi propaganda, but after two days of fighting even the experienced soldiers were glad to be in captivity. A senior NCO of 103 GR, a professional soldier with ten year's service, said: "Ours was a good div: it had the best personnel and the best eqpt. Had it been sent to a quieter sector in the beginning and committed gradually, it would have been a formidable opponent. Now we are finished".

(Source: Second Army IS No. 173)

The GAF - Where Now?

The big battles open on the Western borders of Germany, battles which may well culminate in the final defeat of the WEHRMACHT. It is essential therefore to appreciate the part which the GAF is playing or hopes to play and how it may affect the outcome.

It was obvious that, following its withdrawal from all occupied countries in the West, except North Holland, maj decisions would have to be made as to its tactical and strategic use during the battles which were obviously in the offing.

A certain amount of time was granted for this regrouping and planning due to the difficulties of the Allied Air Forces in creating fwd bases after such a rapid distance devouring adv. Particularly so as the onset of winter already portended in an early and unusually hy rainfall during Oct.

Allied are superiority presented the GAF High Comd with two man and inescapable facts (i) that we had a strong, adequate Tac Air Force, (ii) that we could, at the same time, carry on, on an over increasing scale, a strategic air assault.

Fear of our strategic raids appeared to dominate at first and only a very small tactical force of SEF was grouped on the whole of the long front involved. Towards the end of Oct and the early days of Nov, however, there were strong indications of a reversal of this policy. More units were noticed coming into fwd areas and stronger, more offensive minded, patrols were being flown over the battle areas from METZ to NIJMEGEN.

The Western Front divides itself into five main areas dictated by the gen layout of the airfds:-

- Zone 1 - TWENTE-ENSCHDEE/PLANTLUNNE with the group of associated airfds.
- Zone 2 - BONNINGHARDT-KIRCHHELLING.
- Zone 3 - OSTHEIM-WAHN-EUDENBACH-BONN.
- Zone 4 - RHEIN-MAIN-ESCHBORN-NIDDA-LANGENDIEBACH.
- Zone 5 - STUTTGART.

Along this front were disposed some 600 operational SEFs fairly evenly distributed except in the South. There appeared to be on call a further allocation of aircraft, primarily allocated to "Defence of Reich", which would bring the total aircraft available for tactical purposes up to somewhere in the neighbourhood of 1000.

During the first battles at AACHEN determined attempts were made to assist ground tps and protect them from our attacks; in addition the Diggers of the West Wall were given priority air cover.

The last week has seen a gradual change in this disposition due to (i) attacks by the Allies on his airfds in the central sector, and (ii) the weather. As is well known the GAF is just as badly off as we are in the lack of concrete runway airfds and the recent hy rains are proving troublesome. In addition, bomb craters on soggy grass airfds are an even more difficult proposition in the repair line than filling holes in concrete. The net result is that more and more aircraft are moving North to the airfds in Zone 1. Until at the moment there are probably some 300 plus SEFs in this area.

This obviously has unbalanced his dispositions and in view of fuel stringency the extra distance which aircraft must fly to reach the immediate battle area in front of COLOGNE will inevitably have a bearing on operational efficiency.

These airfds too must be getting very overcrowded as they are the Gp on which most of the operational jet aircraft are based.

This situation resembles in many aspects that when the GAF was driven back from his bases South of the SEINE. First indecision, then rapid moves and changes of locations which completely upset any coordinated plan there may have been. There is however one exception, that is the development and use of jet propelled aircraft. The GAF is undoubtedly making strenuous efforts to build up an effective force of these aircraft. His maj success so far with them has been on recon work. For the first time since D day the German Army is being well supplied with infm obtained by recon aircraft. This reflected in the various moves of his ground tps to meet our attacks which have shown an awareness and appreciation of our intentions not previously noticed. In addition these aircraft have adopted an offensive role, not very effective, against our airfds and I of C mostly using anti-personnel bombs.

The famous GAF Hy Bomber Force is a thing of the past, its glories departed. On the Western Front it is reduced to some two Gruppen engaged on the useless pastime of launching flying bombs against England of which 5 - 10 percent reach the Greater London area and that at quite a cost in aircraft and crews. Another unit still makes attempts, sometimes successful, to drop supplies at DUNKIRK and the remaining Atlantic coast garrisons, again at a cost. To make some sort of night effort against our rear areas the Ju 87 has been recalled from its dishonourable retirement and mixed with night flying FW 190s, has been formed into two or three Gruppen with initial eqpt of some 100 aircraft with approximately 60 per cent serviceability. In this connection PW tell us that their targets are definitely related to the previous days recce results.

To sum up, the GAF SEF force is still strong in numbers but is weak in efficiency for the following reasons:

- (a) Indecision in high places (local superiority could be obtained).
- (b) Insufficiency of airfids of 1944 standards.
- (c) Deterioration in quality of pilots.
- (d) Growing shortage of fuel which is not only affecting actual flying ops but moves of units from airfd to airfd which now largely takes place by rail and therefore cannot be done quickly. The GAF has thus lost its mobility, once justifiably one of its prides.

ENEMY METHODS

Tapping of Sigs Lines

A captured file of patrol reports of II Bn 351 GR underlines again the need for constant observance of telephone security.

Extracts from two of the reports appear below:

- (a) Patrol report of 7 Coy, 10 Nov 44:

"Task: To tap the telephone line found by an earlier patrol.

Report: The patrol reached the place where the line had been without contacting the enemy. The line was no longer there; only an empty American cable drum was found..."

- (b) Suggested patrol, 6 Coy, 17 Nov 44.

"To: II Bn

The coy suggest that a fighting patrol be sent on 17 Nov to bring in prisoners from HATTERATH.

Tasks: (i) To search the two red houses and take prisoners.
(ii) To tap a sigs line.

Str: 1 offr, 2 NCOs, 12 OR and one line sec.

Arms: 1 LMG, 12 machine pistols.

Line section - 1,500m cable"

(Source: GSI 30 Corps)

VOICE OF THE WEHRMACHT

Life on WALCHEREN

The following diary extracts give the impressions of one Hans SPECHT who helped to garrison WALCHEREN Island from his bunker on

the coastline. Taken prisoner during the latter stages of the op which cleared the ZEEELAND Islands, he kept a fairly careful record of the developments leading up to the capture of himself and his bunker mates. The Diary also contains an account of the circumstances of his surrender and of his reactions to the initial stages of life as a PW:

Tue 17 Oct 44 Alert at about 2000 hrs last night. Guard duty until 2400 hrs. Lots of mail yesterday, but nothing for me.

Wed 18 Oct 44 Night quiet. Bad weather. Several flights of enemy aircraft over our posn. Watched the crash of a four-engined bomber. In the afternoon a bath in DOMBURG, the first one in weeks.

Thu 19 Oct 44 1500 hrs hy seas during high tide. They say that between 17 and 19 Oct spring-tide will set in.

Sat 21 Oct 44 Hy thunder of guns from the direction of FLUSHING all night long and still going on (1000 hrs). Since yesterday the water has risen quite a lot. Cattle from the surrounding country have been brought together into a small area, they appear very hungry and thirsty. Wrote home yesterday but it is doubtful whether any mail will leave here anymore. At noon bomber attack on BRESKENS.

Sun 22 Oct 44 Hy arty fire in direction of BRESKENS. According to the radio, BRESKENS has been partly occupied by the Tommy.

Mon 23 Oct 44 Stand-to during the night but nothing happened. No more arty fire can be heard from BRESKENS. Bomber attacks during the afternoon. Two four-engined bombers brought down, one at 1605 hrs, the other one at 1622 hrs, both of them near us. One of them fell into the sea, none of the crew were saved, but the Navy brought back a rubber boat.

Fri 27 Oct 44 Nothing special to report during the last few days. Tonight we received notice that we will move tomorrow.

Sat 28 Oct 44 Clear weather, night quiet. At 1130 hrs attack by bombers on our Stutzpunkt. Bomb crater only about 5 m from us. No cas. Our coy marches off in the morning.

Sun 29 Oct 44 We were supposed to move with the rest of the coy to our new location. From 1030 to 1330 bomber attack. This time we stayed in our bunker. The bunker was badly shaken but nobody was hurt! 1630 hrs we start marching to the new Stutzpunkt, where we arrive at 1830 hrs.

Thu 31 Oct 44 Yesterday morning I went with Sgt KEMPE and ROTMEIER to our old Stutzpunkt to get the rest of our things. Shortly after we left there the time-bomb in the entrance to the dump exploded. At DOMBURG new attacks of strong bomber fms, could NOT observe the hits. In the afternoon return to new location. After arrival we move into a different bunker. At 1900 hrs I go with S to get the rations. Very dirty! The ration ship did not arrive.

.../7

- Wed 1 Nov 44 During the night by fire of our battery from DOMBURG towards FLUSHING ? During the morning by naval gunfire on WEST-KAPELLE and DOMBURG. Also strong bomber attacks. Towards 1300 hrs only spasmodic fire. The enemy is said to be in WEST-KAPELLE.
- Thu 2 Nov 44 Night quiet and rainy. In the morning more arty fire. DOMBURG to FLUSHING in the hand of the enemy. Weather clears and fighter-bombers come over again. During the day the small weakly garrisoned isle across from WALCHEREN was occupied. Our retreat is cut off now.
- Fri 3 Nov 44 Night was quiet except for some arty fire, and the day until now - 1600 hrs - was also comparatively quiet. Is it the hour before the storm? A small cat strayed into our bunker and I am looking after it.
- Sat 4 Nov 44 Contrary to expectations the night was quiet. Building a raft in the hope that we will still be got out of here. In the morning it clears and the fighter-bombers are getting active again. In the early hrs of the afternoon air attack on our posn.
- Mon 6 Nov 44 Arty fire, in the afternoon fighter-bomber attacks. S. is sick and is to be sent back to HILDESHEIM. He takes some letters to wife and family along.
- Tue 7 Nov 44 Half past five in the morning we leave for Stutzpunkt HEIDELBERG. Arty fire and three fighter-bomber attacks. All day on sentry duty. Miserable weather, miserable quarters, NOT much sleep.
- Wed 8 Nov 44 1000 hrs: Enemy is said to have broken through. No connection LEFT or RIGHT. With me in the bunker are six comrades. Looking fwd to being captured if everything goes will. At about 1330 we surrendered after the bunker of the CSM was found to be empty. We were searched right away, watch and money taken away. Then to DOMBURG, where we were put into a school. We met most of our comrades here, we were the last ones to be taken prisoner.
- Thu 9 Nov 44 0800 hrs: Start of march in direction FROUWEN-POLDER. Should have been transported to FLUSHING. On account of the stormy weather had to turn back and were put into barracks of the former Stutzpunkt Johannmickel (?). 40 men in the barracks.
- Fri 10 Nov 44 Very stormy and cold. The offrs among us were taken away by boat yesterday. We are supposed to start at 0900 hrs. Our guards are very decent.

(Concerning the surrender of our coy)

During the night about 3 o'clock by mortar fire, and again at 6 o'clock in the morning. Under the protection of this fire the Tommy came up. Our men had taken cover. At 9 o'clock the whole coy were PW except the men in our bunker who didn't surrender until 1330 hrs. Great superiority of the enemy in material, especially tanks. We had no heavy weapons. Morale of our men in spite

.../8

of everything good. The oppressive feeling of inferiority and useless fighting is over with. Don't know the cas of our coy.

Enemy methods

The following report has been received from the Sigs Offr Ninth US Army:

At 1930 hrs on 13 Nov the switchboard operator of an arty bn received a call from someone who identified himself as "switchboard chief from CONQUER". The caller requested to be infm how many offrs the arty unit had together with name, rank and number of each. The calling party is said to have spoken with a German accent and when asked by the operator to authenticate, replied that he did not know what authentication meant and wanted to know what it meant. He was given NO infm.

On the same date another arty unit reported a similar request to their switchboard operator. Wire patrols checked the lines thoroughly after this incident and succeeded in finding bare spots at which the tapping could have been done.

Source: Second Army IS No 168)

The Evac of Civs

The evac of the town of HOENGEN on 6 Nov was accomplished at the point of a gun by a GAF fd unit believed to be 22 GAF Regt under comd of Oberlt ISEN assisted by Albert WINANZ, former Mayor of WEHR. It was necessary for the tps to threaten to shoot hostages in order to get the civs to evac. Looting and slaughter of livestock were said to have taken place during the evac. It is reported that each soldier was allowed 83 lbs of booty which could be sent to the rear with the ration train and then sent by mail to the soldier's home. A PW stated that much of the loot included shoes - in certain cases taken off the feet of civs - and other articles of clothing. Part of the town was burned after the evac.

(Source; First US Army)

Arty Methods

A PW said that owing to the efficiency of Brit sound-ranging and flash-spotting an order has been issued forbidding the use of a roving gun for ranging. As far as possible all guns were to fire simultaneously.

(Source: 12 Corps)

Decimation

During the recent adv by the French they captured nearly all of Rear HQ Nineteenth Army near MULHOUSE. Included in the personnel taken were 190 offrs, all no doubt vital to the German war effort.

(Source: 3 Brit Div Int Summary)